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Can We Buy Peace On Earth?: The Price of Freezing
Terrorist Assets in a Post-September 11 World
I. Introduction
In the aftermath of the catastrophic attacks of September 11,
2001, the United States found itself in the unique and unenviable
position of having to unleash forces to combat the threat of
terrorism on all fronts. As the search for the terrorists mounted,
President George W. Bush promised that our response would not
be limited to military retaliation; he threatened financial,
Specifically,
economic, and social repercussions as well.1
would be a
of
funding
terrorists
President Bush stated that starving
2
A U.S.
primary objective of the new war on terrorism.
into
sent
was
$238,000
at
least
that
government inquiry revealed
the United States through wire transfers to aid the hijackers in the
attacks, which were estimated to have cost around $500,000 to
carry out.3 This inquiry illustrates the important role that financial
backing plays in terrorist attacks. In his response to the terrorist
attacks, President Bush stated emphatically, "[m]oney is the lifeoperations. Today, we're asking the world to
blood of terrorist
4
stop payment.",
As the first step in fighting the financial war on terrorism,
President Bush issued an Executive Order on September 24, 2001,
freezing the assets of twenty-seven people and groups who were
identified as having ties to the al-Qaeda network and whose
resources potentially support it.5 The Order gives the Treasury
I Transcript of President Bush's Address to Joint Session of Congress, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 20, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
2 Id.
3 Kurt Eichenwald, Terror Money Hardto Block, Officials Find,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2001, at Al.
4 Agence France-Presse, Bush Calls on the World to Freeze TerroristAssets, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, Sept. 24, 2001, at http://www.inq7.net/nat/2001/sep/25/nat_2-1.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
5 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701
(2002).
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Department greater power to identify the support structure of the
terrorist organizations and the ability to thwart any U.S.
transactions that would assist terrorists in transferring or accessing
funds.6 In the last few months, the Treasury Department has
expanded this initial list of twenty-seven.7 Currently, the United
States has identified well over 215 groups and organizations
linked to terrorist activity whose assets have been frozen and who
are subject to various degrees of economic sanctions.' In addition,
over 10,500 accounts have been subpoenaed, resulting in FBI
examination of more than 320,000 documents.9
While sanctions for those on the list include everything from
denying visas to limiting immigration, the scope of this Comment
is limited to a discussion of those groups and organizations that
are subject to financial sanctions. Specifically, this Comment will
focus on a Treasury Department list of eighty-eight organizations,
entities, and individuals that are subject to the strictest financial
sanctions. This list includes the individuals and businesses
associated with al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (bin Laden), the
primary mastermind behind the attacks of September 11, 2001.0
The United States has frozen all bank assets in connection with
these people in an attempt to bring them to justice by cutting off
their monetary supply." The Executive Order' 2 authorizing these
6 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet on Terrorist Financing
Executive Order (Sept. 24, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010924-2html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
7 OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., WHAT You NEED TO
SANCTIONS,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
ABOUT U.S.

KNOw

sanctions/terrorism.html (last visited on Jan. 29, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
8 OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., TERRORISTS AND

THEIR SUPPORTERS, http://www.treas.gov/rewards/terrorismlist.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
9 Edward Alden, Complex Finances Defy Global Policing, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2002, at http://specials.ft.com/attackonterrorism/FT3D9KEAXXC.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
10 Id.
II See id.
12 Cutting Terrorist FinancialLifeline, 12 PHILLIPS BUS. INT'L 19 (Sept. 17, 2001),

LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.

2003]

FREEZING TERRORIST ASSETS

actions also attempts to freeze foreign bank assets by giving the
Treasury Department authority to block assets of, and deny access
to U.S. markets by, those foreign banks that refuse to cooperate
with the U.S. authorities in identifying and freezing terrorist
assets. 3 While the United States has the authority to freeze assets
of terrorist organizations in the United States, 4 it is the assertion
of authority to freeze foreign bank assets that is arguably outside
the scope of U.S..authority.
While the United States defends this approach to combating
terrorism with legislative backing in the form of the new Patriot
Act, 5 other legislation combating terrorism, 16 and U.N. resolutions
requiring countries to freeze terrorist assets, 17 some countries
argue that these means are not entirely justified and that the United
States is overreaching by threatening economic sanctions on those
countries that do not support its foreign policy stance. 8
Furthermore, alternative measures may exist that would be equally
effective in combating financial support for terrorism without
infringing on the sovereignty of foreign banks.
This Comment will explore the current United States policy
regarding the asset freeze, including the objectives and
justification for these acts in light of the September 11 attacks. 9
The Comment will discuss the U.S. authority for freezing terrorist
assets2" and examine the United States's actions under the
authority of various international agreements and proclamations,

13 Id.
14 Id.

15 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism ("Patriot Act") Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.S.).
16 House Approves Measures To Implement Anti-Terrorism Treaties, BULLETIN'S

FRONTRUNNER, Dec. 21, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (indicating that
the United States is preparing to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, a 1999 U.N. Convention, which only thirteen countries
have ratified). See Bertrand G. Ramcharan, The Security Council, Human Rights and
HumanitarianIssues; Thinking Aloud, 38 U.N. CHRONICLE 4, 23 (Dec. 1, 2001), LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File.
17 See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
19 See infra Part I1.A-E.
20 See infra notes 74-113 and accompanying text.
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such as U.N. resolutions, and its responsibilities as a member to
the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT)."1 Additionally, this Comment will
describe the international reaction to these requests for freezing
assets 22 and the rationale for failure to comply with this request23
from the perspective of countries that have denied the request,
specifically focusing on Lebanon.24 Furthermore, this Comment
will examine a few analogous situations in which the United States
decided to impose economic sanctions and the repercussions of
those decisions. 25 Finally, this Comment will look at alternative
approaches to the threats of freezing bank assets and compare the
effectiveness of those approaches.26
II. Fighting the Financial War Against Terrorism
A. FinancialBattle is Criticalto the Success of the War on
Terrorism
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, compelled swift
retaliatory measures from the United States. 27 Just days after the
attacks, President Bush declared that starving the terrorists of their
funding would be crucial to success in a war on terrorism 28 and
would be critical to thwarting future attempts at terrorism.2 ' The
21 See infra notes 114-207 and accompanying text.

22 See infra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 209-75 and accompanying text.
24 Pascal Mallet, Lebanon Breaks Ground in Defying U.S. Request to Hit
8, 2001,
http://www.lebanon.com/news/local/
"Terrorist" Hezbollah, Nov.
2001/11/8.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
25 See infra notes 330-33 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 341-38 and accompanying text.

27 See Mike Allen, Bush Moves to Cut Terrorists' Support; Foreign Banks Urged
to Help Freeze Assets of27 Entities, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at Al. President Bush
has stated that he will not authorize release of all of the information establishing a direct
link between bin Laden and the attacks because it is classified; yet clear evidence leads

the administration to conclude that bin Laden is responsible for the attacks. Id.
28 Reyko Huang, Mounting Costs of the Financial War Against Terrorism, CENTER

at http://www.cdi.org/
Dec.
20,
2001,
DEFENSE
INFORMATION,
terrorism/financial2.cfm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
29 See John King et al., Bush Cites Crackdown on Money Networks That Work for
FOR
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financial war on terrorism is not a new concept: the Clinton
Administration recognized that this financial attack was critical to
successfully punishing bin Laden in 1999 after he was found to be
responsible for attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania.3 ° In response, President Bill Clinton issued Executive
Order 13,129, which blocked access to property and prohibited
transactions with the Taliban.3 ' While this order froze over $254
million in Taliban assets in the United States, 32 President Clinton's
objective to cripple the financial structure of the organization was
unsuccessful for a number of reasons, including the difficulty in
tracking terrorist assets, the lack of any attempt to punish countries
for noncompliance, and the limited support the United States
received from international financial institutions.33 On September
24, 2001, President Bush announced a much broader executive
order that froze U.S. financial assets of, and prohibits U.S.
transactions
with,
twenty-seven
terrorist
organizations,
individuals, corporations, and non-profit organizations believed to
be associated with bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network.34
Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill stated:
With the signing of this Executive Order, we have the
President's explicit directive to block the U.S. assets of any
domestic or foreign financial institution that refuses to cooperate
with us in blocking assets of terrorist organizations. This order
is a wakeup call to financial institutions around the world-if
you have any involvement in the financing of the al-Qaeda
organization, you have two choices. Cooperate in this fight, or
we will freeze your U.S. assets. We will punish you for
'Mass Murderers', CNN, Nov. 7, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/UX/
1 1/07/inv.freezing.assets/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
30 Marc Kaufman, U.S. Froze $254 Million in Taliban Cash in 1999, WASH. POST,
Oct. 13, 2001, at A16.
31 Exec. Order No. 13,129, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1999), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(2001)
32 Kaufman, supra note 30, at A16. This amount is well over the amount linked to
terrorist groups and frozen since the September 11 attacks. Id.
33 David E. Sanger & Joseph Kahn, A Nation Challenged: The Overview; Bush
Freezes Assets Linked To Terror Net; Russians Offer Airspace and Arms Support, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at Al.
34 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701
(2001).
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providing the resources that make these evil acts possible.35

One key to winning the war on terrorism is to cut off the
financial support of the terrorists; yet challenges to this stem from
the fact that their financial support is widespread and often

concealed by legitimate organizations. 36 Allegedly, al-Qaeda has
cells in more than forty countries, often forming alliances with
other prominent terrorist groups. 37 Also, al-Qaeda's current
financial backing is no longer predominantly from the personal
funds of bin Laden; instead, this backing comes from wealthy
supporters who donate funds to Islamic charities and relief
organizations, which are then passed through to the terrorists.3 8

This rise in charitable and organizational support for terrorist
groups makes the task of identifying and freezing assets much
more difficult than when state-sponsored terrorism was
prevalent. 39 The issue of freezing assets has become controversial

because of the inevitable freeze of charitable assets along with
those assets supporting terrorism.4"

Since the initial Executive

Order, the U.S. government has identified four categories of
terrorist organizations with different degrees of sanctions imposed
on each category."
The groups listed range from prominent
Muslim charities to Yemeni honey shops to direct aides to bin
Laden.42

Under the Executive Order, all U.S. citizens and

35 Statement of Paul O'Neill on Order Freezing Terrorist Assets, Sept. 24, 2001,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/09/mil-010924-usial 4.htm (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
36 Eichenwald, supranote 3, at Al.
37 Press Release, Off. of Pub. Aff., Kenneth W. Dam, Money That Kills: The
Financial Front of The War on Terrorism, Oct. 22, 2001, at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/po709.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
38 Id.
39 Eichenwald, supra note 3, at B4.
40 See id.
41 Fourth U.S. TerroristList Adds to Confusion, DAILY EXCELSIOR, Nov. 6, 2001,
at http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/0lnov08/inter.htm#6 (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). If the organization is on the
list of twenty-eight "foreign terrorist organizations" ("FTOs"), a long-standing category,
U.S. banks must block the funds of these groups. Another list of approximately eightyeight organizations with stricter financial sanctions includes several of those associated
with bin Laden. Id.
42 David S. Hilzenrath & John Mintz, More Assets on Hold in Anti-Terror Effort,
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businesses are prohibited from doing business with the people and
organizations on the list.43 Additionally, any U.S. entity holding
funds from these groups may not transfer them to anyone else.44
As Bush stated:
We're putting banks and financial institutions around the world
on notice, we will work with their governments, ask them to
freeze or block the terrorists' ability to access funds in foreign
accounts. If they fail to help us by [sharing information or]
freezing accounts, the Department of the Treasury now has the
authority to freeze their bank's assets and transactions in the
United States.45
B. The U.S. Asset Freeze Process
The asset freezing process started with a flurry of activity in
the weeks following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The freezing
of terrorist assets began on September 24, 2001, when President
Bush issued Executive Order 13,224, blocking the assets of
twenty-seven organizations linked to bin Laden and naming these
groups as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).4 6
Following this Order, the SDGT expanded rapidly as a number of
parties were added to this SDGT list. For example, a second list
arose from a review of a preexisting list of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).47 This Act requires
verification every two years of groups on the list, as well as an
evaluation of whether or not any other organizations need to be
added to the list. On October 10, the "Most Wanted Terrorists"
list was released, specifically directed toward those who have

WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2001, at A16.
43 Press Release, Off. of Pub. Aff., Secretary of Secretary of the Treasury Paul
O'Neill On Terrorist Asset Blocking Order Issued Today (Oct. 12, 2001), at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po685.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
44 See id.
45 Allen, supra note 27, at A8.
46 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701
(2001).
47 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
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intentionally targeted Americans in terrorist attacks. 8
On October 12, more parties were added to the SDGT listthirty-nine
entities,
thirty-three
individuals,
and
six
organizations.49 Eighteen of those on the list are also on the "Most
Wanted Terrorist" list.5" On November 2, twenty-two of the FTOs
were added to the list of SDGTs, thereby freezing the assets of
organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, leading to great
controversy.
On November 7, sixty-two more organizations
were added to the SDGT list, freezing their assets as well. In
addition to this first wave of lists, the United States has added over
forty organizations on eighteen lists in the past year. 2
C. The Effectiveness of the Asset Freeze
The U.S. government states that freezing assets is the most
effective way to combat terrorism, and as of November 18, 2002,
it has frozen more than $200 million in assets of terroristsupporting groups.53 Additionally, the cooperation of over 160
governments worldwide has blocked assets worth an additional
$70 million. 4 While the identification of over 168 organizations55
48 Bush Announces "Most Wanted" Terrorist List, CNN, Oct. 11, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/l0/10/inv.most.wanted (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Bin Laden,
several al-Qaeda members, and Hezbollah members are among those on the list. Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.

51 Id. The other six out of twenty-eight were listed as SDGTs under the annex to
the Executive Order 13,224; therefore, this addition put all FTOs on the SDGT list. Id.
The significance of this designation is that the United States could not freeze assets of
those associated with FTOs; it could only require banks to freeze the assets of the FTOs
themselves. Id. However, as SDGTs, any individuals or organizations that are
associated with them are subject to asset freezing as well, and the government may
impose sanctions on foreign banks which provide services to SDGTs. AEDPA § 219
(authorizing the Secretary of State to designate FTOs); see also Exec. Order No. 13,224,
3 C.F.R. 786 (2001) (regarding the scope of authority for dealing with SDGTs and banks
that deal with them), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701 (2001); Bush Orders Banks to
Freeze Assets of Suspected Terror Supporters in Response to Attacks: Fear of Further
Assaults Heightens Security, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Sept. 24, 2001, at 73-

71A, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
52 OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supranote 8.

53 Tom Raum, Evil Allies of Convenience, MERCURY, Nov. 18, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File.

54 The Administration's National Money Laundering Strategy for 2002: Hearing
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involved in the financing of terrorism is certainly effective in
hindering the financial capabilities of al-Qaeda, many terrorist
assets are not maintained or transferred in banks; but rather they
are funneled through the underground system of money
transferring called the "Hawala system. 56 The Hawala system is
an informal money transfer system used among Islamic groups
and countries around the world, including the United States. 7 The
system is paperless as "there are no official bank records or
statements"; 58 yet, it has the ability to move hundreds of thousands
of dollars around the world in one day. 9 This traceless system
makes the United States's task of tracking funding for terrorists, in
general, difficult; more specifically, the system facilitates the
funding of terrorist attacks on other countries. 60 Experts say that
the financial strength of bin Laden was a key factor in the success
of the September 11 attacks. 61 Although systems like Hawala will
make tracking every financial source impossible, freezing
identifiable assets is certainly a first step in fighting the financial
2
war.

6

Before the Comm. on Senate Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2002)
(prepared statement of the Honorable Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Sec'y of Treas. Comm.
on Senate Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs), available at http://www.senate.gov/
-banking/02_ 10hrg/100302/dam.htm.
55 Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Freezes Assets of 2 Groups, for Diverting Gifts to Al
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at A17.
56 John King & Kelly Wallace, Bush Cites Crackdown on Money Networks That
Work for 'Mass Murderers,' CNN, Nov. 7, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
US/I 1/07/inv.freezing.assets/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
57

Id.

58 Id.

Meenakshi Ganguly, A Banking System Built for Terrorism, TIME ONLINE
Oct.
25,
2001,
at
http://www.time/com/time/world/article/
0,8599,178227,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
60 Id.
59

EDITION,

61 Adam Cohen, Following the Money: Freeze! How the U.S. Plans to attack terror
by shutting down its financialsupply lines, TIME, Oct. 8, 2001 at 68.
62 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701
(2001).
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D. The TerroristDesignationProcess
The process by which an organization is added to the U.S.
terrorist list is extensive. Greater understanding of the process
may lead to a resolution of the accusations and claims that the
process is arbitrary or unjust.63 The list involves a determination
of multiple U.S. agencies, including the Departments of Treasury,
State, and Justice; the FBI; and the intelligence community.64
After extensive review of both open sources and confidential
information, "including tips and leads about persons and entities
who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism," the State
Department establishes a subset of the agencies, which create a
background file on the suspected terrorist. Before the designation
process is even instigated, this file is reviewed for adequacy.65
Furthermore, the agency examines the file "for legal sufficiency
under President Bush's September 24 Executive Order."6 6 The
National Security Council, in a meeting of deputy agency heads,
makes the final determination.67
If there is a terrorist
recommendation, the Secretary of the Treasury, in conjunction
with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, will issue a
"designation and blocking order., 68 The Treasury Department's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is responsible for
implementing the blocking order. 69 The National Security Council
also takes into consideration opinions and concerns from U.S.
embassies, other nations, friendly countries, and allies.7" The
process is extensive-many arena's actors in the national
government offer input. 7 This description seems to refute the
allegations mentioned earlier that the United States casually
63

See infra note 169.

64 OFF. OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: BACKGROUND

ON TERROR ASSETS DESIGNATION PROCESS (Feb. 28, 2002), http://usinfo.state.gov/

topical/pol/terror/02022809.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation).
65 Id.
66 Id.

67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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''72
defines "terrorism" by merely "calling it when it sees it.
Such a
detailed process filled with several levels of checks and balances
gives rise to an inference of great consideration in determining the
existence of a terrorist group whose assets are to be frozen.

E. The Needfor MultinationalCooperation in the War on
Terrorism
Despite the importance of this national process, tracking and
freezing terrorist assets will not be successful without multinational cooperation.73 President Bush made it clear from the
beginning that the success of this initiative would be contingent
upon worldwide support for the financial sanctions:
This is not ...just America's fight, he told a joint session of

Congress Sept[ember] 20, "this is the world's fight." To locate
and destroy the global tentacles of al-Qaeda and other such
terror groups, we will ask, and we will need, the help of police
forces, intelligence services and banking systems around the
world.
The issue is how the United States can justify several aspects
of the asset freezing. Understandably, the United States has
authority to freeze terrorist assets, but what about the assets of
banks, which are seemingly neutral entities in the war on
terrorism?

72 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
73 Bush OrdersBanks to Freeze Assets of Suspected Terror Supporters in Response
to Attacks: Fearof Further Assaults Heightens Security, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS
DIGEST, Sept. 24, 2001, at 737A1, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. Money
laundering experts have warned the United States of the obstacles it faces in blocking
terrorists' finances. Id. "Past attempts to cut off the cash flow of bin Laden's
Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda terrorist network, including three executive orders by
former President Bill Clinton, had failed because the sources of the group's finances
were immensely difficult to trace, experts said." Id. Despite the difficulty in reaching
bin Laden's money in other countries, the Bush Administration noted that Bush's order
was far more expansive than those of the Clinton Administration. Id. "The Plan
expanded to the entire world a tactic that to date had only been used against groups in the
Middle East" by preventing institutions that refused to cooperate from operating in the
United States. Id.
74 Michael T. Klare, Can The Alliance Hold?; The anti-terrorismforces will stick
together only as long as each nation thinks that the fight is in its own interest.
NEWSDAY, Jan. 6, 2002 at B4.
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III. The U.S. Authority to Freeze Foreign Bank Assets
A. The Executive Order-ModernSourcefor TerroristAsset
FreezingPower
We will starve the terrorists of funding, turn them against each
other, rout them out of their safe hiding places, and bring them
to justice."
-President George W. Bush
The financial war on terrorism began on September 24, 2001,
with President Bush's Executive Order 13,224 blocking terrorist
property.76 The President based this authority upon several
national and international sources."
The Order operates by
expanding the "Treasury Department's power to target the support
structure of terrorist organizations, freeze"78 any of their assets in
the United States, block any of their attempts to conduct U.S.
transactions, and deny access to U.S. markets for those foreign
banks that refuse to cooperate with the United States in helping
identify and freeze terrorist assets abroad.79 The Executive Order
named specific individuals and organizations whose assets were to
75 OFF. OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, FACT SHEET ON TERRORIST FINANCING EXECUTIVE

ORDER (Sept. 24, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 200109242.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
76 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701
(2001).
77 The Executive Order was issued pursuant to the following authority:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of
the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, § 5 of the United States
Participation Act of 1945, and § 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in view
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1214 of December 8, 1998,
UNSCR 1267 of October 15, 1999, UNSCR 1333 of December 12, 2000, and
the multilateral sanctions contained therein, and UNSCR 1262 of July 30, 2001,
establishing a mechanism to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1333.
OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., WHAT You NEED TO KNOW

ABOUT U.S. SANCTIONS (Sept. 24, 2001), at http://www.treas.gov/office/
enforcement/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html (internal citations omitted) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
78 Id.
79 FACT SHEET ON TERRORIST FINANCING EXECUTIVE ORDER, supra note 75.
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be blocked and authorized the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of the Treasury to determine additional designations in the
future.8° The Order expansively strengthened the U.S.
government's ability to identify and control terrorist assets most
significantly by permitting the United States to regulate foreign
banks that refuse to comply with the order to block terrorist
assets.8'
B. Sources of Legislative Supportfor the Executive Order
Asset Freeze
1. International Emergency Economic Powers Act
A principal source of presidential power is found in the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).82 This
Act allows the President to "prohibit any transactions in foreign
exchange" when faced with a national emergency.84
The
Presidential power is invoked when three factors are met:
[1] there [is] an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States; [2] the President declare[s] a national emergency with
respect to that threat; and .. [3] the IEEPA powers employed

85
[are] exercised only for the purpose of dealing with the threat.
Unquestionably, the threat of terrorism, manifested in the
events of September 11, constitute an unusual and extraordinary
80 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701
(2001); see FACT SHEET ON TERRORIST FINANCING EXECUTIVE ORDER, supra note 75.
81 FACT SHEET ON TERRORIST FINANCING EXECUTIVE ORDER, supra note 75.
Notably, the expansion of authority was extensive: The Executive Order broadened
"existing authority in three principal ways:" (1) it expanded "the coverage of existing
Executive Orders from terrorism in the Middle East to global terrorism," (2) the Order
expanded "the class of targeted groups to include all those who are 'associated with'
designated terrorist groups; and" (3) "established our ability to block the U.S. assets of,
and deny access to U.S. markets to, those foreign banks that refuse to freeze terrorist
assets." Id.
82 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Harvard Law Review Association, The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt To Control PresidentialEmergency Power, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1115 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
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threat, whose planning took place substantially outside of the
United States. President Bush's exercise of his statutory authority
to declare a national emergency86 was done in his address to
Congress on September 24, 2001.87 The power to freeze assets has
been exercised for the purpose of dealing with the threat of
terrorism.88 Therefore, all of the requirements to exercise
Presidential authority to freeze assets under IEEPA appear to have
been met.
2. Trading with the Enemy Act
Further support for the asset freeze exists in a broader
provision, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), which
permits the President to prohibit certain financial transactions
during time of war." Invoked at various times over the past
century against those doing business in North Vietnam, Cambodia,
China, North Korea, and Cuba, this Act protects the United States
from foreign assets held in our country that may potentially be
used to cause harm.9" This Act does not suggest that this provision
be used to authorize freezing assets belonging to those who are not
our enemies. 9 Therefore, any extraterritorial powers that would
allow the United States to freeze assets of those who were not
linked to terrorists but simply refused to freeze terrorist assets are
not found in the Act.92 The Executive Order issued by President
Bush makes this leap from authorizing the U.S. government to
freeze assets of those deemed to be adverse to our interest to the

86

National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000).

87 President Bush's Message to Congress, Sept. 24, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 24,
2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
88 Id.

89 Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(1)(A) (1917). The Act
allows the President to "prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange." Id.This Act has
been interpreted broadly to give the President much discretion in its administration. See,
e.g., Richardson v. Simon, 560 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the Secretary of
Treasury's refusal to release assets which were blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations did not violate the TWEA).
90 Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949) (holding that the TWEA gave the
President the power to continue to control foreign assets even after they were transferred
to a custodian).
91 Id.
92

Id.
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authorization of the United States to freeze third-party assets for
failure to freeze according to our instructions, which is arguably
not authorized by the Act.93
C. Administrative and Other Authority
Other provisions suggesting U.S. authority to freeze assets
include the use of "blacklists" of countries by OFAC.94 OFAC is
responsible for administering sanctions against those banks who
do not comply with regulations; it has imposed millions of dollars
of civil penalties involving American banks. 95 Most of the fines
are imposed because of a bank's failure to block illicit transfers
when references were made to a blacklisted country.9 6 Therefore,
with OFAC the United States has, in addition to its authority under
IEEPA and TWEA, a mechanism for administrating these and
other laws. 97
Furthermore, since 1996, the United States has designated
certain groups as terrorist organizations.98 "Upon notification
under (2)(A)(i) of this provision, the Secretary of the Treasury
may require U.S. financial institutions possessing or controlling
any assets of any foreign organization included in the notification
to block all financial transactions involving those assets." 99 This
power to designate certain groups as FTOs after a review of an
administrative record was conferred upon the Secretary of State by
AEDPA in 1996.100 Once an organization is designated as a FTO,
all financial transactions involving its assets may be blocked until

93 Id.
94 OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEP'T OF TREAS., FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

REGULATIONS
FOR THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY
2
(Dec.
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/regulations/t 1I facbk.pdf.

27,

2002),

95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.

98 8 U.S.C.S. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (2001).
99 Id. The Treasury Department has the authority to freeze assets of foreign
terrorist organizations, defined by this chapter as (a) foreign, (b) "engage[d] in terrorist
activity" or capable of and intending to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and (c)
engaged in terrorist activity that "threatens the security of the United States nationals or
the national security of the United States." Id. § 1189(a)(I)(A)-(C).
100 Id. § 1189 (a)(2)(A)(i), (3)(A).
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further notice.l°1
D. New FoundAuthority for Fighting the War on Terrorism
In addition to preexisting laws, the legislative response to
September 11 with respect to financial issues has been enormous.
For instance, Congress amended the Bank Secrecy Act on October
26, 2001, not only to strengthen the reporting requirements of
banks, but also to illustrate that the prevention of terrorism was an
additional purpose for requiring this record keeping. 10 2 The
banking industry has cooperated with the federal government
substantially since 1996 by filing over 600,000 Suspicious
Activity Reports.0 3 This experience, as well as the additional
reporting requirements, will make banks a valuable ally in the war
on terrorism.' °4 In addition, the boundaries that existed between
tracking assets and prosecuting terrorist activity will be resolved
through the amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the
Right to Financial Privacy Act because they will allow foreign
intelligence agencies to share information with the Treasury
Crimes
Enforcement
Network
Department's
Financial
05
(FinCEN). '
The most critical piece of legislation enacted in response to
September 11 is the Patriot Act of 200 1.°6 Directly relating to the
financial war, one of the purposes of the Act is to focus on foreign
jurisdictions and financial institutions operating outside the United
States as potential places for money laundering schemes.'0° Title
III, Section 301108 expands the power of the Secretary of the
Treasury to deal with money laundering problems arising in
101 Id. § 1189 (a)(2).
102

12 U.S.C.S. § 1829b(2001).

James E. Smith, The Freezing of Assets Can Be an Effective Weapon, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 6, 2001, at A47. Notably, around $2 trillion flows through the U.S. banking system
alone each day. Id.
104 Id.
103

105 Kenneth Dam, U.S. Says Global Help is Key to Stopping TerroristFund,Jan. 29,
2002, http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushk/others/2002/012901.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
106 USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in
scattered titles of U.S.C.S.).
107 Id § 5311.

108 31 U.S.C.S. § 5301.
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foreign jurisdictions."°9 Specifically, the Secretary of the Treasury
may require banks to take "special measures" of record keeping
and report certain financial transactions with respect to financial
institutions operating outside the United States if those institutions
appear to raise a money laundering concern. "'
Additionally, through the Treasury Department, Congress has
set up a Foreign Asset Tracking Center (FTAC), whose purpose is
to gather information about the types of fundraising used by
identified terrorist groups and inform law enforcement officials
about location and movement of terrorist funds." 2 U.S. Treasury
Undersecretary for Enforcement Jimmy Gurule stated, "[t]he
FTAC is dedicated to identifying the financial infrastructure of
terrorist organizations worldwide and curtail[ing] their ability to
move money through the international banking system.' 113
Terrorist financing was the primary issue at the National
Money Laundering Strategy in July 2002, which set forth a
coordinated, government-wide strategy to combat the problem, as
well as identifying specific objectives integral to winning the
financial war." 4 With international cooperation as the most
important tool in fighting the financial war, the United States
stated that "the overriding goal would be to deny terrorist groups
access to the international financial system, to impair the ability of
terrorists to raise funds and to expose, isolate, and incapacitate the
financial networks of terrorists."" 5
By far, the most significant indication of the priority of
fighting terrorism is the ground-breaking creation of a new
division of government devoted strictly to maintaining homeland
security." 16
The legislation approving the Department of
109

Id. § 5318; 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(b).

110 Id. § 5311.

111 31 U.S.C.S. § 5318A.
112 T.K. Maloy, Senate Looks to Halt Terror Money, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 26,

2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
113 Id.
114 U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., 2002 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY (2002),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/monlaund.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
115 Id. at 4.

116 Richard Thompkins, Bush to Sign Homeland Security Bill, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Nov. 25, 2002, http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StorylD=20021125-112155-1412r (on file
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Homeland Security, signed by President Bush on November 25,
2002, unites over twenty government agencies to create a
department whose primary focus is to protect the United States
from terrorist attacks." 7 While the organizational efforts will take
months to solidify," 8 this initiative promises to provide a
comprehensive and efficient way to protect the United States from
terrorist attacks once it is established. 19 Reflective of the Bush
Administration's deep-seated commitment to fighting terrorism,
the objectives addressed by this new department will assure that
the financial war on terrorism
will continue to be a principal
12
objective of U.S. policy. 1
At some point, issues of extraterritoriality arise. While it
appears that the U.S. government has a plethora of sources of
authority to protect national interests and security through the use
of financial sanctions, considering the U.S. commitment 12to1
multinational organizations, this authority may have limits.
Freezing terrorist assets is one thing, but freezing assets of allies
and those with whom it has international economic agreements is
another. 2 2 The United States has never threatened to take action
against overseas banks for failure to comply with freezing
assets. 123 Often the United States has pushed the envelope on this
issue and rarely has it been denied authority to act in its own best
interests, but these recent
measures may have questionable
124
authority.
international
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120

Id.

121

See Tompkins, supra note 116.

122 Janine Zacharia, Bush Freezes Terrorists' US FinancialAssets, US to ask
Foreign Banks to Follow Suit, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at 1, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File. Commenting on this, Treasury Department General Counsel,
David Aufhasuer stated: "In this case, this reaches anybody who's been used, anybody
whose facilities are being used." Id. See also Mike Allen & Paul Blustein, Bush Moves
to Cut Terrorist'sSupport; ForeignBanks Urgedto Help Freeze, WASH. POST, Sept. 25,
2001, at Al. "The US has been reluctant to impose sanctions on foreign financial
institutions, and the sanctions could be very effective." Id.
123 Id.
124 See id.
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IV. International Authority for Freezing Bank Assets
We are in a moral struggle to fight an evil that is anathema to all
faiths. Every state and every people has a part to play. This was
on humanity, and humanity must respond to it as
an attack
125
one.
-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
A. The Importance of MultinationalCooperation
The key to success in freezing terrorist assets lies in a
multinational approach, not only from a practical standpointmost of the assets are beyond U.S. borders 26 -but also from a
political standpoint. The attacks of September 11 were not simply
attacks on the United States but rather an attack on innocent
citizens from over eighty countries'27 and on the "founding
'
In order to be most
principles of the [United Nations] itself."128
effective and in order to respond to an attack on the world, not
simply the United States, the battle needs to be viewed as a
worldwide one, not simply an American one.'29
B.' The CriticalRole of the UnitedNations
1. Prior Actions of the United Nations to Combat
Terrorism
The United Nations is the organization in the best position to
lead the international coalition against terrorism. 130 The United
Nations attempted to engage in a war against financing of
terrorism in 1999 by adopting the International Convention for the

125 Judy Aita, UN Called to Action Against Terrorism, Oct. 1, 2001,
http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/10/mil-O11001-usia09.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
126 Zacharia, supra note 122, at 1. Terrorism experts estimate that one-third of the
money sent to Islamic militant organizations originates in the U.S. Id.
127 Deagln de Bradn, No Room ForNeutrality, New York Mayor Tells UN Assembly,
IRISH TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at 10, availableat LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
128 Id. (quoting New York Mayor Guiliani).
129

Id. at 10.

Mark Weisbrot, Fight Bin Laden by Choking Funding Sources, RECORD, Oct. 12,
2001, at 13, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
130
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Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT).'31 The
purpose of the Convention was to call upon all member-states to
take action and adopt regulatory measures to prevent and eliminate
the financing of terrorism and to facilitate the exchange of
information concerning the movement of funds. 132 In order for the
convention to be in effect, it must be ratified by twenty-two
member-states; as of April 2002, thirty-one countries had ratified
the convention, 133 but there are numerous countries who have yet
not ratified it.134 Although open for signature by member-states
beginning in January 2001, this Convention was largely ignored
until the events of September 11 reawakened the commitment to
fighting terrorism. 35 Before September 11, only forty-one
countries had signed; since the attacks, 103 more have joined
them. 36 The act of ratifying is of greater significance than the act
of signing, however, since the act of signing is of minimal
significance without enforcement.1 37 One of the flaws of the
Convention is that it has no official monitoring body; therefore,
any enforcement of the provisions must come through memberstates. 138

131 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,

Gen. Assembly Res. 54/109 (GA 1999).
132 Id.; Preamble (citing paragraph 3(f) of General Assembly resolution 51/210 of
17 Dec. 1996).
133 Freezing Terrorist Assets: Background on the InternationalConvention on the

Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, April 23, 2002, at http://www.cunr.org/
priorities/Convention%20on%2OSuppression%20of%20Finance%20ot/20Terrorist.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
134 UN Resolution 1373 Resuscitates Stale Terrorist Convention, 13 MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, 4, 10 (Feb. 2002).

Fifty-four nations including Afghanistan,

Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates have not signed. Id.
135 Id.
136 Ahmed Rashid, Straw faces rough ride from Islamabad hardliners, DAILY

TELEGRAPH, May 27, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
137 There is a difference between signing a U.N. convention and ratifying or
acceding (which is what states would be doing now, because it is past the deadline to
ratify). A state who merely signs is not required to establish laws that conform with the
United Nations; however, signing commits it to not violating the purpose of the
convention. Ratifying the Convention means a state is committing to to harmonizing its
laws with the substance of the treaty. See infra note 144.
138 See infra note 140.
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2. U.N. Response to September 11
Post-September 11, the United Nations recognized that a
convention may not be the most effective manner in which it could
fight the war on terrorism because there is too much flexibility
among member-states on whether they will adhere to the
provisions of the convention. 139 Therefore, its line of action was to
have the Security Council adopt Resolution 1373 on September
40
28, 2001, which directly requires the freezing of terrorist assets.
Unlike treaties or conventions, which the member-states must
agree to adopt or comply with, resolutions are binding upon all
189 U.N. member-states. 14 ' Additionally, the Security Council
placed the resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
further signifying the importance of the provisions because this
chapter authorizes the Security Council to enforce the resolution
terms by the use of measures ranging from economic sanctions to
military force.' 4 2Among other things, Resolution 1373 requires
states to:
l(b) Criminalize the willful provision or collection.., of funds
by their nationals or territories with the intention that the funds
should be used.., in order to carry out terrorist acts; (c) Freeze
without delay funds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit,
terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of
terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled... by such
persons... ; 2(a) Refrain from providing any form of support or
relief, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in
terrorist acts... ; (c) Deny safe haven to those who finance,
43
plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens.
Recognizing the importance of fighting terrorism at its
economic roots, the United Nations took this far-reaching

139 See Michael J. Jordan, UN may be best equipped to rebuild Afghanistan,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 25, 2001, at 7.
140 S. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) [hereinafter Res.
1373].
141 See Jordan, supra note 139.

142 Res. 1373, supra note 140.
143 Res. 1373, supra note 140, at 2. Resolution 1373 also expanded earlier U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1333, which required countries to freeze all assets
belonging to bin Laden and his associates. Dam, supra note 37.
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approach and created in each member country a clearinghouse for
144
complying with the resolution and combating terrorism.
Furthermore, the Security Council established a counter-terrorism
committee to monitor adherence of member-states to the
resolution through the use of questionnaires. 45 This committee
will enhance the effectiveness of the resolution considerably
because one of the major criticisms of the Convention was that it
did not contain a monitoring body. 146 The answers to these
questionnaires were due December 27, 2001,'147 "but as of
148
February 11, 2002, only 140 countries had responded.'
Furthermore, the responses to the questionnaires of whose assets
will be frozen have already produced varied results. 49 Even great
144 Remarks By Ambassador John Negroponte, U.S. Permanent Representative To
The United Nations at the Heritage Foundation, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 11, 2002,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. On the purpose of Resolution 1373, "It is
designed to turn every domestic law enforcement agency, every department of treasury,
every telecommunications ministry and every transportation authority against terrorism's
money and movement anywhere and everywhere in the world." Id.
145Id.
146 See id.

147 Id. The inquiries asked countries about specific procedures and mechanisms
they had undertook to freeze terrorist accounts, the offenses and penalties implemented
to punish terrorist activities, and their plans to give information to other member states.
Id. The expectation was not that the reports would indicate full implementation, but
rather state a plan of action and identify areas where action is needed. Daily
Highlights-New Security Council counter-terrorismpanel making progress, chairman
says, Oct. 19, 2001, http://www.un.org/News/dh/20011019.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
148 U.S. Permanent Representative To The United Nations at the Heritage
Foundation,supra note 144. The Financial Action Task Force (FTAF) called upon those
countries who had yet to respond to do so in order to re-affirm a commitment to
combating terrorism. FATF pressesforfirm backing against the financing of terrorism,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 10, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.

David E. Kalish, EU Slow to Pursue Terror Groups'Assets, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8,
at
2002, 6. The European Union had frozen the assets of just two of twenty-eight groups
on a U.S. list of non-al-Qaeda organizations, and out of the dozens of people on the
U.S.'s list of suspected terrorists, the European Union put only eight on its list as of
March. 8, 2002. Id. Despite the slow start in the asset freeze compliance, the European
Union has now compiled a list of over fifty organizations and individuals on its terrorist
list. US Cooperates with EU to Block Terrorist Funding, May 2, 2002, at
http://www.ict.org.il (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation). Most recently, the European Union added a communist group
in the Philippines, the NPA, to its list of terrorist organizations and froze its assets,
following the lead of the United States and other countries. Philippines May Seek
149
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allies, such as the European Union and the United States, had
varied groups on their lists, setting the stage for potential conflict
later. 5° Despite reaffirming a commitment to combating financial
" ' the
war on terrorism in its biannual summit with Russia,15
European Union refused to delineate certain groups as terrorist
organizations.5 2 While the United States has included certain
organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas on its terrorist list, the
European Union gets around this classification by separately
considering a group's military wing from its civilian wing. 5 . This
approach has been criticized as short-sighted,
unreasonable, and
154
member-states.
E.U.
the
of
intent
the
against
The binding nature of this resolution makes it a far more
effective international mechanism for freezing terrorist assets than
the 1999 Convention. 55 Does this mean that the freezing of funds
of organizations and persons on the U.S. list is automatically
justified and binding upon all U.N. nations? Not necessarily. The
issue turns on the definition of "terrorist."' 156 The debate over the
term "terrorist" has intensified over the past few months as
countries refuse to freeze the assets of those organizations which
do not, by their standards, constitute terrorist organizations. 15 If
adopted, the U.N. convention contains a broad definition of
"terrorism":
[a]ny other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose
of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international
Extradition of Communist Leader, Agence France Presse, Nov. 2, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis

Library, News Group File.
150 See US Cooperates with EU to Block TerroristFunding,supra note 149.

151Gareth Harding, EU, Russia clash over Chechnya, Nov. 11, 2002, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
152

Id.

153 Report Faults EU's List of Terrorist Organizations, June

7,

2002, at

http://216.26.163.62/2002/euterror 06 07.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
154 Id.

155 See supra notes 136-37.
156 See Kalish, supra note 149, at 6.
157 See infra notes 311-28 and accompanying text.
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15 8
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

This definition of terrorism has been a huge source of
disagreement among nations in deciding whose assets need to be
blocked. 159 Unfortunately, the United Nations has never been able
to define unequivocally the issue and notably has defined
"terrorism" eleven times in the past thirty years. 6 ' While the
United Nations recognizes the need for legal precision on the
definition, it stated that it would work to define terrorism, when
the U.N.'s legal committee called the Sixth Committee
reconvenes.' 16 In fact, during the meeting in the fall of 2002, the
Sixth Committee raised the
issue of the need to define "terrorism"
162
but still refused to do

SO.

The U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee, created in response
to September 11 to deal with the issue of member-state
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
supra note 131, at 3.
159 See Kalish, supra note 149, at 6.
158

160 UN Gridlocked Over Definition Of Terrorism, BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, Feb.
4, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. A definition of terrorism is the key to
creating an enforcement mechanism for freezing assets. Id.; see also Finalizing Treaty
Requires Agreement On 'armedforces', foreign occupation', Anti-terrorism Committee
Told, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 4, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. In
explaining the difficulty in a uniform definition of terrorism:
The twelve other United Nations treaties on terrorism have relied on an
"operational" definition of terrorism in a specific circumstance, and each treaty
has dealt exclusively with a particular manifestation of terrorist activity. For
example, there are separate treaties to address such issues as bombings,
hijackings, hostage-taking and covert financing of terrorist activities. The
comprehensive convention on terrorism is intended to fill in the gaps left by
those sectoral treaties and to advance the level and types of international
cooperation to combat terrorism. Another issue yet to be fully agreed upon in
the negotiations is the relationship between the sectoral treaties and the
comprehensive treaty, as well as future instruments that might be negotiated on
terrorism.

Id.
161 UN Gridlocked Over Definition of Terrorism, supra note 160.
162 UN Legal Committee is told observance of humanitarianlaw critical in era when
civilians are increasingly targets in combat; Debate also begins on work toward antiterrorismconvention, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 3, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group
File. As of Feb, 26, 2003 (a full year and a half since September 11) the United Nations
is still being pressured to define terrorism and has not done so. See Libyan Foreign
Minister Calls for UN Reform, BBC Monitoring Int'l. Reports, Feb. 26, 2003, at LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File.
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compliance in adopting anti-terrorism measures, claimed that it
"would not define terrorism in a legal sense, although its members
can identify blatant terrorism." '63 Critics claim that the United
Nations is shirking its responsibility to the world at a critical time
1 64
because it is in the best position to define "terrorism.
Therefore, the world must rely upon the various contradictory
statements and definitions that already exist in order to determine
a justification for freezing assets.1 65 Without the guidance of the
United Nations on this issue, the world is left166to decide what
constitutes "good terrorism" and "bad terrorism.,
C. The Difficult Task of Defining Terrorism
One view from the Mitchell Commission, which assessed the
causes of Israeli-Palestinian violence last spring, stated:
"Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of
randomly selected noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to
promote a political outcome by ' 67spreading terror and
demoralization throughout a population.'
A proposal in December 2001 from the E.U. Council of
Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs sought to define "terrorism"
as "offenses intentionally committed by an individual or a group
against one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the
aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the
political, economic, or social structures of a country."' 68 The
United States's recent approach has been characterized by some

163 Bruce Zagaris, UN Securiy Council Hears Progress of Counter-Terrorism
Committee, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 113, 114(2002).
164 Michael J. Jordan, Terrorism's Slippery Definition Eludes UN Diplomats,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 4, 2002, at 7. "The UN must do its duty and differentiate
between terrorists and freedom fighters," said Rizwan Khan, a spokeswoman for the
Pakistani U.N. mission. Id. "Isn't that what the UN was made for, to bring peace to the
world?" Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. Tal Becker, Israeli adviser to the United Nations, suggested that the focus be
on the actions done by the organizations, not the reasoning behind the actions, in order to
prevent certain acts of terrorism from being legitimized by certain causes. Id. at 8.
167 Id. at 8.
168 Id. This raised the issue in the legal community of infringement of "fundamental
democratic rights" like trade union activity and anti-globalization protests. Id.
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critics as a "calls it as it sees it" approach.169
In addition to the distinctions made between Western nations
in defining terrorism, a more extensive difference exists between
the developed and developing worlds. 7 ° The latter difference is
more of an impediment to solving the larger issues. 17 1 "The
crucial distinction is that while national liberation movements in
developing nations were seen as genuine freedom fighters, the
developed world perceived them as terrorists.' 72 The Western
world's definition of terrorism must be harmonized with other
countries' definitions in order to solve the problem.'73 Foreign
Minister Syed Hamid calls for more dialogue, conferences, and
interaction as the way to come together to fight terrorism: 174 "We
may not come to an agreement in one go but dialogue is the best
therapy so as to understand and think in the process of how best to
tackle this issue [terrorism].', 175 The Foreign Minister also stated
that the vagueness of the definition of "terrorism" caused
confusion because one group could be a terrorist one day and a
national hero the next. 177
Finally, Syed Hamid proposed
suggestions for defining "terrorism" by examining several angles
of "terrorism," such as "the historical context, the philosophy of
terrorism, geo-economy and political bases, policy and legal
issues, the impact of international relations, the psychological
attitude, and the new lexicon or terms on how one should approach

169

Id.

170 Jalina Joheng & Lee Shi-lan, Seek Definition of Terrorism First, "Civilisation
and Terrorism: A Roundtable Dialogue 2002," NEW STRAITS TIMES MALAYSIA, Feb. 27,
2002, at 4, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
171Id.
172 Id. at 4 (quoting Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid).

173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. Seyed Hamid spoke at a roundtable discussion on terrorism organized by the
Institute of Knowledge Advancement of Universiti Teknologi Mara ("UiTM") in
collaboration with the Foreign Ministry and the Malaysian Press Institute on Febuary 26,
2002. Id. He emphasized the need for United Nations leadership in this arena and
criticized the United Nations's role in this as being more supportive instead of central.
Id.
176 Id.
176 Id.; see also infra notes 261-63 (concerning Lebanon's characterization of
Hezbollah).
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'
terrorism."178
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov echoed this
sentiment in a speech in February 2003 detailing the need for
countries' actions to be in compliance with international
standards. 179
Additionally, the Palestinian Hamas group has joined in the
battle, calling upon Arab and Muslim countries to formulate their
own definition of "terrorism,' ' 8 ° which would distinguish between
terrorists and resistance groups.181 Hamas also claimed that the
U.S. definition of "terrorism" was limited to that which serves its2
8
own personal interests and is not grounded in international law.
However, Hamas itself did not propose any sort of guideline or
indication of what would be an appropriate definition, signifying
that the issue is easy to recognize but difficult to remedy.'83
Further viewpoints include that announced by President Bush that
"terrorism is known to be the slaughter of civilians for political
gain by such groups."' 84 While this may be true, the Islamic world
will more likely "define terrorism as the slaughter of unarmed
civilians-unless the unarmed civilians happen to be Israelis
slaughtered by Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hezbollah."' 18 5
While expressing concern over the escalation of terrorist
attacks, Lebanese Interior Minister Elias Murr'8 6 emphasized the
178 Shah Alam, Inter-CivilisationalDialogue Needed to Understand Terrorism
Concept, MALAYSIA GEN. NEWS, Feb. 26, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group

File.
179 Thomas Marzahl, Keep Anti-Terrorism Campaign Within International Law:

Russia AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 3, 2002, at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group
File (quoting Sergei Ivanov as stating "[i]f those who blow up apartment houses in
Moscow are declared freedom fighters while in other countries such persons are referred
to as terrorists, one cannot even think of forging a united anti-terrorist front").
180 Hamas Defies "U.S. Threats," Says U.S. Views PalestiniansThrough "Zionist
Eyes, " BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., Feb. 1, 2002, at 1,at LEXIS, News Group File.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See id.

184 Diana West, The Free and The Proud: The Yardstick of the 'Arrogant' West,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at A21, LEXIS, News Group File. President Bush cited the
Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah as examples. Id.
185 Id.
186 Nayla Razzouk, Arab Ministers Vow to Help War on Terror, Blast Israel

"Terrorism," AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 30, 2002, at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
Group File.
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importance of distinguishing " 'between terrorism and peoples'
right to fight using all means to liberate their land.' The Council
reiterated a call for 'holding an international conference, under the
auspices of the United Nations, to discuss and define the concept
of terrorism and differentiate
it from people's legitimate struggle
'
against occupation.' ' I88
The United States Code defines "terrorism" as the following:
"the term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national
groups or clandestine agents." 189 The Code goes on to define the
term "terrorist group" as "any group practicing, or which 190has
significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.
Another issue raised is the ability of the United States to act
independently of the United Nations.191 As a member of the
United Nations, the United States has agreed to follow
international principles and strengthen international relations. But
may it disregard these standards in favor of its own national
interest? The nature of the attacks has led some to say yes, while
other countries caution against disregarding international law. 192
Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov raised the issue of further
actions to be taken in response to the attacks, pledging support to
the United States; at the same time, Ivanov emphasized the need to
adhere to traditional policies and principles of international law.1 93
But U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that
the United States has the right to defend itself how ever it deems
necessary, stating "I take strong exception to the view that [the
United States] need[s] a [U.N.] mandate to act. . . . We were
attacked, and an attack on one [member of NATO] is all the
'
justification we need to take action to defend all of us." 194
187

Id.

188

Id.

189

22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)-(3) (2000).

190 Id.
191

See Bruce Cronin, The Two Faces of the United Nations: The Tension Between

Intergovernmentalismand Transnationalism,in 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 53 (2002).
192

See infra notes 196-97.

Steven Erlanger, Russian Aide Warns U.S. Not to Extend War to Iraq, N.Y.
Feb. 4, 2002, at A10.
194 Id.
193

TIMES,
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While the United Nations and the United States remain
separate entities with respect to the war on terrorism, the lack of a
U.N. definition of "terrorism" or a definitive list of terrorist
organizations whose assets are to be frozen may give the United
States the green light to carry out its policies, especially if the
United Nations takes a less than comprehensive approach. 95
Despite U.N. authority to allow the blacklists, some countries do
not approve of the process. 196 Sweden, specifically, is asking the
United Nations to reconsider its method of blacklisting certain
Any U.N. country can add
people and organizations.197
organizations to the list without evidence to support its claim,
although the majority of the initial 154 names on the U.N. list
were added by the United States.' 98 The most recent additions to
the list occurred on October, 22, 2002, making it the tenth list
since September 11 and bringing the total to well over 300
organizations and individuals whose assets are to be frozen.' 99
After an organization is placed on the list, the government is
required to begin to freeze the organization's financial assets,
leaving no room for appeal.2 °° Sweden and other nations are
concerned that this process violates the principals of the United
Nations, which seek to protect the rights of the individual, and
they request disclosure behind each decision to add a party to the
list.2 0' Despite the fact that U.N. members have forty-eight hours
to raise objections to those parties on the list, no objections have
been made.20 2 This indicates that there must have been some
confidence in the determination by the U.N. sanctions committee,

195 See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
196 David Usborne, Campaign Against Terrorism: Sweden Protests at UN Blacklist,

INDEP. (London), Feb. 13, 2002, at 12.
197 Id.

198 Id.

199 Charter of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Persons and Entities) List 2002
No. 4, http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/personsentities/list-no4.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
200 Usborne, supra note 196.
201 Id. The political controversy in Sweden began when three Swedish nationals
who were born in Somalia were added to the list. Id.
202 Id.
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which oversees the list.2°3 Despite this confidence, the United
States has been pressured by European countries to allow a review
of the appeals procedures governments can use if they are put on
the U.N. terrorism list.204
The European Union has also
encouraged adoption of an exemption from the asset freeze for
money used for housing and food. °5 In August 2002, the United
States agreed to consider these proposals, showing an increasing
willingness to harmonize its objective in the war on terrorism with
the policies of other U.N. member-states.2 6
D. InternationalSupport or Conflict with the U.S. Asset
Freeze?
1. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
A country or organization dissatisfied with U.S. steps to freeze
assets may attempt to attack the actions under other international
agreements, such as GATT. 20 7 There is an argument that
threatening to freeze foreign assets conflicts with U.S. obligations
under GATT." 8 Under its agreement in GATT, the United States
must not treat certain members differently than others; freezing
the assets of banks in member-states could arguably be a cause of
action under this agreement. 2 9 There is an exception, however,
for those actions that may be necessary to protect a country's
national interest. 21 1 If any countries seek recourse against the
203 See

id.

204 Alison Taylor, Government Yields to EU Pressureover Terror Asset Crackdown,
WORLD MARKET RES., Aug. 16, 2002, at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
205 Id.
206

See id.

207 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
208 See id.

209 See GATT art. 1.
210 GATT art. XXI. Article XXI states as follows:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) to require any contracting
party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to
its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party from
taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests.
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United States claiming violations of GATT, this exception will be
the best defense for the United States.2 1 In light of the magnitude
of the tragedy of September 11, the United States would probably
be able to rely on this exception to its GATT agreements,212 and
any country challenging U.S. action may have to find recourse
elsewhere since the U.S. action will likely be found justifiable.213
Therefore, GATT seems to support, rather than diminish, U.S.
authority to freeze assets.
2. Financial Action Task Force
In addition to U.N. actions, a global task force is fighting
terrorist financing. 2 4 The Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (FATF), an international group comprised of thirtyone members, including Canada, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan, and
the United States as well as the European Commission, was
formed in Paris in 1989 primarily to fight money laundering.215 In
light of the September 11 attacks, the FAFT held an emergency
meeting in Washington in October 2001 so it could expand its role
in countering terrorist financing.216 This meeting resulted in
articulating the goal of identifying jurisdictions that fail to take
appropriate measures to combat financing of terrorism by a June
2002 deadline. 17
Additionally, the FATF adopted eight
211 See Jay Hancock, Current Crisis Affords Cover for All Sorts of Weird Things,
BALT. SUN, Oct. 7, 2001, at IF (discussing the ability of the United States to use the
exception to justify a wide range of measures).
212 1 GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 599-606
(updated 6th ed. 1995). The national security exception has only been invoked seven
times in the fifty-plus years that GATT has been in effect, and none of these instances
stemmed from attacks as egregious as those suffered by the United States on September
11. Id.
213 See Hancock, supra note 211.

214 Global Task Force Pushes Fight Against Terrorist Financing, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 1, 2002, at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
215 Id. In the years since the task force was formed, Hong Kong has become part of
China and the European Commission is now the European Union.
216 Id.
217 Id. Currently the FATF has a "blacklist" of jurisdictions, which are deemed to
have critical deficiencies in their anti-money laundering efforts or have not been willing
to comply with efforts to combat terrorist financing. Among those on this list of
nineteen are Guatemala, Lebanon, the Philippines, and Russia. Some on the list, such as
Hungary, St. Kitts, and Nevis, have made rapid progress in order to comply with
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recommendations that its members must have complied with by
June 2002 that will also serve as guidance to those non-member
218
countries who have inquiries about how to fight terrorism.
These recommendations "include taking immediate steps to ratify
and implement the relevant U.N. instruments: criminalizing the
financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations;
freezing and confiscating terrorist assets; and imposing antimoney laundering requirements on alternative remittance
systems. 21 9 Compliance with these measures by June 2002 is
mandatory for members, and the FATF has threatened measures,
such as enhanced surveillance and reporting of financial
transactions, against those countries deemed to be non220
cooperative.
Measures taken by organizations not controlled by
the United States help validate the cause of freezing terrorist assets
and add to the policy of creating a world, rather than simply a
U.S., battle against terrorism. 221 The creation of this organization
strengthens and legitimizes the United States's strong position
against terrorist financing and allows other countries to take a
leadership role in the financial war.222 It is misleading to think that
the United States is the leader of the war and the rest of the world
is just following along. The success of the war depends on a
By regulating financial
stronger international coalition.223
institutions and terrorist assets, measures taken by the FATF are
almost as substantial as, 22 4 and arguably support, the U.S. goal of
freezing terrorist assets.

international standards. Id.
218 Id.
219

Id.

220

Id.

221 Kenneth Dam, Hunting Down Dirty Cash: The InternationalCoalition Must Step
Up its Efforts to Stem the Flow of TerroristFunds or Risk FurtherAttack, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2001, at 17.
222 See id.

223 Id.
224

See Global Task Force Pushes Fight Against Terrorist Financing, supra note
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V. International Relations and Policy Considerations
A. Many Countries Support the UnitedStates
Cooperative response to the United States's financial actions
has been substantial with over 160 countries issuing their own
freezing orders. 25 Since the terrorist attacks, more than $78
million dollars in terrorist assets have been frozen by foreign
governments in addition to the $34 million frozen by the United
States.226 For the first few months of the financial sanctions, with
the strong backing of countries like Great Britain, 2 7 the United
States appeared to have carte blanche with respect to its financial
combat force.228 Even Japan, a traditionally pacifist country, has
not only ordered its banks and other financial institutions to freeze
any assets belonging to the Taliban229 but has also passed a
controversial bill that would allow Japan to provide non-combat
support to the United States for its war on terrorism.23° To date,
Japan has frozen the assets of over 350 terrorists and terrorist
organizations. 231 Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh
claimed to "stand shoulder to shoulder with the international
community and the United States of America in our battle against
225 The Financial War on Terrorism, 107th Cong. (Oct. 9, 2002) (statement by
Jimmy Gurule, Under Secretary for Enforcement before the U.S. Senate Fin Comm.).
226 Id.
227 Bush OrdersBanks to FreezeAssets of Suspected Terror Supporters in Response
to Attacks Fear of FurtherAssaults Heightens Security, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS
DIGEST, Sept. 24, 2001, at 737A1, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. During his
visit to the White House on September 20, 2001, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
expressed solidarity by saying that Britain would wholeheartedly support the United
States in "dismantling the apparatus of terror and eradicating the evil of mass terrorism
in our world." Id.After meeting with Bush, he reiterated, "We stand side by side with
you now, without hesitation." Id.
228 See Todd Zeranski, Country-By-Country Stance, Contribution to U.S. Terror
Fight,BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 2, 2001, at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
229 Id.
230 Reuters, Japan Panel Passes Controversial U.S. Support Bill, Oct. 16, 2001,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old-editions/1017_01/for3.htm#f3 (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Japanese
leaders expressed a willingness to show that Japan was a reliable U.S. ally by passing the
bill in contrast to its lack of support during the Gulf War. Id.
231 Press Conference from US Embassy, Tokyo, FDCH Federal Department and
Agency Documents, Feb. 23, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
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this global menace. 232 Support has been shown in the Middle
East as well, with the central bank of the United Arab Emirates
issuing regulations to stop the transfer of money to those on the
U.S. terrorist lists. 233 President Bush's threat that those doing
business with these organizations would be subject to harsh U.S.
economic sanctions strongly influenced the central bank to impose
this restriction and further to promise punishment from the United
Arab Emirates for noncompliance.234 Countries from all over the
world have expressed support for the United States. For example,
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao stated that
China supports the financial war against terrorist groups.235
Several other countries, ranging from Thailand to Australia have
expressed support, but some allege that they are not aware of the
presence of any banks within their borders who have accounts
linked to individuals or companies on the list.236 Even Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf remarked, "[c]oncerted international
effort is needed to fight terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations ...the carnage in New York and Washington has
raised this struggle to a new level., 237 Despite strong pressure to
comply by freezing terrorist assets, not all countries have been as
responsive as Great Britain, China, and Japan.238

232 BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REMARKS WITH EXTERNAL

http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2001/5408.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation).
233 Reuters, UAE Outlaws Transfers to Groups Linked to Bin Laden, FNDLAW
LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 8, 2001, at http://news.findlaw.com/news/s/20011108/
attackemiratesbarakaatdc.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation). The UAE Central Bank ordered the banks to sever
any ties with those listed as well as freeze any of their assets held by the bank. Id.
234 Id.
AFFAIRS MINISTER JASWANT SINGH OF INDIA (Oct. 17, 2001),

235

Zeranski, supranote 228.

236 See id.

237 Christiane Amanpour, Taliban, bin Laden, Forged in Crucible of Afghan
Resistance, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/O9/15/amanpour.
taliban (Sept. 16, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
238 Michael Peel & John Willman, The Dirty Money That Is Hardest To Clean Up,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at 16.
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B. Opposition to U.S. Policy
1. Saudi Arabia Compliance Is Questionable
Compliance with the U.S. Executive Order by countries with
close ties to the designated organizations has been mixed.23 9 Saudi
Arabia was initially slow to crack down on terrorist funding, 40
starting only by seizing assets that bin Laden held locally in 1994
but refusing to disclose information about the frozen assets of
certain groups. 241 This lack of disclosure about the number of
accounts frozen or the amount of money involved caused the
United States initially to question Saudi Arabia's willingness to
comply with the anti-terrorism efforts. 42 The stringent U.S.
requests were particularly difficult for this country, whose citizens
and foreign workers send extensive assets abroad.243 For this
reason as well as the fact that many within its borders are
sympathizers with bin Laden, the Saudis claimed that it would be
impossible to ensure that no money from the country ends up in
the hands of bin Laden or al-Qaeda.244 Despite these allegations of
noncompliance with the financial sanctions, Saudi Arabia has
severed all ties with the Taliban, which leaves Pakistan as the only
nation in the Middle East to maintain relations with the regime.245
Despite these initial hesitancies, the Saudis have emerged as a
Middle East supporter of quashing terrorist financing, according to
some. 246 In addition to freezing dozens of bank accounts within
the country, the Saudi Arabian government has engaged in several
multinational efforts to crack down on financing terrorism,
including setting up a counter-terrorism committee with the United
States to meet and discuss challenges and strategies to deal with

239 See id. (outlining the complexities of following the executive order).
240 Howard Schneider, Saudis See Obstacles in Freezing Accounts, WASH. POST,
Oct. 25, 2001.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.

245 Zeranski, supra note 228.
246 Saudi Actions to Crack Down on Terrorist Financing,Oct. 18, 2002 at LEXIS,

Nexis Library, News Group File.
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financing.247 Other efforts include helping identify companies that
bin Laden used to move money through the world, setting up
internal procedures to train employees to better spot money
laundering, tightening regulation of its banks, 248 and taking action
with the 9United States to freeze terrorist assets outside of the
country.

24

Reports of Saudi Arabia turning a blind eye to terrorist
financing masked by charities may, however, remain an obstacle
for the United States, according to the Council for Foreign
Relations.25 ° This "blind eye" allegation was fueled most recently
by reports that the wife of the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the
United States, Princess Haifa al-Faisal, daughter of King Faisal,
provided money that ended up in the hands of two of the
September 11 hijackers. 1 While the rumors of this event may
have been exaggerated (the Princess reports that she gave money
to a Jordanian woman with a medical condition, who later gave it
to her husband, who gave it to friends of the hijackers, who used it
to rent an apartment in San Diego), the degrees of separation are
too close for comfort for the U.S. Administration. 2 The United
States remains concerned that Saudi wealth is used to finance an
overwhelming amount of terrorist activity, and the balance
between maintaining relations with the Saudis while cracking
down on terrorism is more precarious than ever. 3
Regardless, the lesson to be learned with the Saudi Arabia
situation is that the United States cannot consistently rely on
action as fervent as its own in combating terrorism, 254 and despite
pledges of support, this war on terrorism is to a large extent the
United States's own. For the first few weeks after the terrorist

247

Id.

248

Id.

249

Bruce Zagaris, Countries Differ in Assessment of Counter-terrorismFinancial

Enforcement Cooperation, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Nov. 2002, LEXIS, Nexis

Library, News Group File.
250 Simon Kennedy, U.S. Seeks Help in Tracking 'High Value' Terrorism
Financiers,BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 18, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
251 Editorial, The Princess'sChecks, WASH. POST., Nov. 27, 2002, at A16.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
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attacks, despite minor issues of the same caliber as that of the
Saudis, the United States enjoyed full compliance and solidarity of
countries around the world in support of its financial sanctions.
Inevitably, with all of the competing interests in the Middle East,
this unity did not last. European countries and international
entities have emerged as strong supporters in the war on terrorism;
yet, the United States will undoubtedly remain the leader in the
war and will have to be satisfied with countries merely complying
with its general objectives, rather than adopting every position that
certain organizations are terrorists.255
On November 7, 2001, the United States added a third listing
of sixty-two groups and individuals assets to freeze, gaining
significant headway in the financial war.2 56 The two largest
organizations on the list were Al Barakkat, and Al Taqwa, both of
which have a significant presence in the United States and forty
other countries. 7 Between the two of them, these groups have
allegedly channeled tens of millions of dollars into the al-Qaeda
network,258 making them the heaviest financiers whose assets have
been frozen so far.2 59 Although officials from the groups denied
any involvement in terrorist activities, Bush called them "an entry
point" for terrorist activities and claimed a major victory in
freezing their assets.26 °
2. Lebanon Refuses to Freeze Assets of Hezbollah
Despite the crackdown that resulted from this list, it also
sparked the largest protest so far in the war on terrorism, primarily
from Lebanon.261 In November 2001, Lebanon became the first
255 See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text (identifying initial worldwide
support for U.S. policies). But see infra notes 261-76 and accompanying text (discussing
the first signs of resistance of U.S. policies from other countries).
256 Josh Meyer & Sebastian Rotella, Response to Terror; FinancialAssets; U.S.
CoalitionFreezes Assets in Terror War, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2001, at Al.
257 Id.
258 Id.

259 Id. President Bush described Al Barakaat, based in Somalia, and Al Taqwa, an
Isalamic bank founded in the Bahamas, as critical financial networks for al-Qaeda. Id.
260 Many starting points for gathering funds for bin Laden have been small
storefront operations such as these. Id.
261 Kim Ghattas, Politics: Lebanon Refuses to Freeze Hizbollah's Assets, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 13, 2001, at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
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country to reject a U.S. demand to freeze assets of an
organization 21 2 by refusing to freeze the assets of Hezbollah, 263 a
Shiite Muslim organization opposed to both the United States and
Israel.264 In fact, upon hearing it was on the U.S list of targeted
groups, Hezbollah's leader Sheik Hassan Nasrullah stated that
"[w]e feel proud we have been taken as an enemy that should be
blacklisted as terrorist by the Great Satan who heads the greatest
pyramid of tyranny, repression and arrogance of modem times. 265
The news was formally delivered by Prime Minister Rafik AlHariri on November 7, 2001, to U.S. Ambassador Vincent
Battle.266 In its refusal to comply, Lebanon noted that the
difference between resistance and terrorist organizations was
critical and that it would not freeze assets of an organization that
was simply a political movement in opposition to Israel.267 This
distinction between resistance group and terrorist group was
Lebanon's most significant consideration in deciding whether to
freeze Hezbollah's assets. 268 Hariri also "stated that with the
Hezbollah having nine members in Parliament with control over
municipalities in southern and eastern Lebanon, 270 it would not be
262 Pascal Mallet, Lebanon Breaks Ground in Defying US Request to Hit
"Terrorist" Hezbollah, NEWS FROM BERUIT, Nov. 8, 2001, at http://lebanon.com/news/
local/2001/11/8.htm.
263 John Kifner, Lebanon to Resist U.S. Sanctions on Hezbollah, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2001. Hezbollah, Arabic for "Party of God," began as a group of kidnappers and
suicide bombers in Beirut in the 1980's but has since become a key part of the Lebanese
establishment, with members in Parliament, a popular television station in Lebanon, and
a social service network. Id.
264 Id. "The Hezbollah are regarded as national heroes for their fierce opposition to
the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon." Id.
265 Id. At the rally, members of the group went on to say that any form of assistance
to the United States in the war in Afghanistan should be prohibited because this was "a
war against every Muslim who refuses to bow or kneel to the United States." Id.
266 Mallet, supra note 262.
267

Id.

Ghattas, supra note 261. Syrian President, Bashar el Assad, furthered this
distinction. Id.
269 See Schneider, supra note 240. The government has erred on the side of broadly
defining links to the terrorist organizations as a method of preventing another terrorist
attack. Id.
270 Lebanon Rejects US Demand to Freeze Hezbollah Assets: US Envoy, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 7, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. Importantly,
Hariri believes that he has the backing of both Syria and other Arab countries, due to the
268
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in the country's best interests to freeze their organization's assets,
since it would create a conflict of interest to ask the government to
freeze assets of its own members.
Additionally, even after a conference with Battle, Lebanese
Foreign Minister Mahmud Hammud refused to comply. 271

He

stated his belief that Hezbollah is a legitimate organization whose
support ranges all over the Middle East from Syria to the rest of
the Arab world.272 Furthermore, Hariri reiterated Lebanon's
rejection of the list in Paris on November 10, 2001.273
Hezbollah's recent position is that the United States is using
this list as a political tool in its support of Israel, which Hezbollah
deems to be the true terrorist in the Middle East. 274 The governor

of the Central Bank, Riyad Salamah, cited the lack of evidence
regarding the terrorist identity of Hezbollah. 275 Hezbollah also
considers these threats from the United States "to be significant
interference with not only their resistance but with the
'
sovereignties of other countries and international laws."276

extensive battles against Israel that Hezbollah has engaged in. This factored into
Lebanon's decision not to honor the US request to freeze assets. Also, Hezbollah runs
hundreds of schools, hospitals and dispensaries all over the country, to the benefit of
thousands. Jonathan Curiel, The Many Faces of Hezbollah, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 10,
2001, at A3.
271 Kifner, supra note 263.
272

Id.

273 Lara Marlowe, Lebanese Leader Trying to Restart Israeli-Palestinian,IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 10, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
274 Hezbollah Rebuffs Threat by Bush, Vows to Fight Israeli Occupation, XINHUA
GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 30, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
275 Lebanon: Saudi Arabia, Egypt express support against US "pressure", BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Nov. 10, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.

For his part, Central Bank Governor Riyad Salamah said that the inclusion of Hezbollah
in the US list is illegal and unacceptable, and claimed it to be political, not legal or
financial. In his first reaction, Salamah said:
'The list that came from the United States was supposed to be accompanied by
evidence and results of investigations so that the Higher Investigation
Committee, which has the authority to make relevant decision, [sic] can study
them. The list the Central Bank received contained no evidence. The Higher
Investigation Committee is ready to cooperate with every international authority
if the files contain results of investigations.'
Id.
276

Id.
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a. Lebanon Uses InternationalLaw to Support Its
Stance
This conflict raises the issue of what standard the United States
uses in designating certain groups as terrorist organizations and
addresses the broad definitions that the United States has used to
identify both terrorist supporters and organizations.27 7 In addition
to the question of distinguishing between terrorists and resistance
groups, Lebanon has used international law to justify its refusal to
freeze the assets of Hezbollah. 278 The Central Bank of Lebanon
has asserted four international law justifications to refuse
compliance with U.S. demands to freeze the group's assets:
(1) Bank officials said the demand came from the United States,
and not the United Nations. Therefore the request was not
binding because the measures adopted in September to fight
international terrorism were endorsed in the context of U.N.
Security Resolution 1373. (2) The officials also said that the
demand did not originate from the International Court of the
Justice, whose requests are legally binding. (3) The bank
officials rejected the request because it was not the result of an
internal criminal investigation, which would have required the
Central Bank's intervention. (4) Officials pointed to the absence
of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Lebanon, which
would prescribe the conditions for the freezing of bank accounts
to be undertaken at the request of one of the two parties.279
First, Lebanon distinguishes between the actions of the United
States and of the United Nations. Lebanon believes that the
United States may put forth a list of organizations to block, but
Lebanon is not bound to it. 25 0 Alternatively, if the United Nations
were to put Hezbollah on a terrorist list, perhaps, Lebanon would
have to comply."' As it stands, the United Nations does not have

277 See Schneider, supra note 240. The government has erred on the side of broadly
defining links to the terrorist organizations as a method of preventing another terrorist
attack. Id.
278 See id.
279

Glen C. Carey, Politics-Middle East: Resistance Grows to US Terrorism War,

INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 12, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
280 Ghattas, supra note 261.
281 See id.
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an explicit list of designated terrorist organizations;28 2 it simply
has given instructions to each member-state to eliminate funding
of terrorist organizations and allowed member-states discretion as
to who will be put on the list.283 This supports Lebanon's decision
because, without a U.N. mandate to freeze assets, Lebanon may
contend that Hezbollah is not a terrorist organization, and thus, the
group may not be put it on its list.284 Therefore, Lebanon argues
that it is in compliance with the Resolution. To support this
assertion, Lebanon offers evidence that imposing safeguards to
combat terrorism in general is sufficient to comply with the U.N.
resolution.285
The United States has never said that any country had to
comply with the asset freeze; it merely authorized the Treasury
286
Department to freeze assets of those who choose not to do so.
Therefore, while any list would not be binding on a country, a
particular country has the choice whether it wishes to deal with the
prospects of economic sanctions.287 Certainly, the United States
could use the GATT national security exemption to justify such
sanctions.288 If international efforts at cooperation prove fruitless,
however, the United States will take a unilateral approach.2 89
While this has yet to happen, the United States will argue that
these measures would be independent
of the U.N. Resolution and,
29 °
it.
with
conflict
in
not
are
therefore,
Second, Lebanon suggests that the International Court of
282 Betsy Pitsik, US. Lets UN. Know of Its Steps to Battle Terrorism, WASH. TIMES,

Dec. 20, 2001, at A16.
283 Id.
284 Id. See also, BBC Monitoring News Highlights at 2030 gmt., Dec. 3, 2001, at
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (noting that Lebanon did not include Hezbollah
on its list).
285 See Neil MacFarquhar, To U.S., a Terrorist Group; To Lebanese, a Social

Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at A1O. Lebanon was one of the few countries to
turn in the U.N. questionnaire before the December 27, 2001 deadline, and its
questionnaire detailed efforts to combat terrorism in accordance with the U.N. requests.
Id.
286 See Cutting Terrorists'Financial
Lifeline, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
287 Id.

288 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
289 See Executive Order, supra note 34.
290 Id.
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Justice (ICJ) offers an alternative way to force compliance with
the asset freeze. 29' Member-states are not allowed to request
advisory opinions, therefore, Lebanon's recourse (or U.S.
recourse) will have to be through instituting proceedings in the
ICJ. 29 2
However, no proceedings have been initiated on this
issue.293 If Lebanon wishes to bring a proceeding, it may do so,
but the absence of any ICJ determination on the issue cannot be a
justification for refusal to freeze assets. The ICJ does not operate
by issuing declarations, as Lebanon suggests; thus, the absence of
one should not preclude the asset freeze. 94
Third, Lebanon asserts that the asset freeze order did not flow
from a criminal investigation to determine whether Hezbollah was
in fact a terrorist organization.295
However, evidence that
members of Hezbollah were linked to the Khobar Towers
bombing in 1996, and the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985296
were substantial enough for the United States to include those
individuals on its "Most Wanted Terrorists" list and Hezbollah on
its list of SDGTs.2 97 With the United States taking deliberate and
291 International
Court of Justice Website Foreword, at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm (Mar. 2, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). The
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") was set up in 1945 under the U.N. Charter to be the
judicial body of the organization. Id. The ICJ operates through member state
submission of an issue to the court, upon which it renders a final decision. Id.
Alternatively, a organization may request an advisory opinion from the ICJ, although
currently only twenty-two are allowed to request them. International Court of Justice
Website, Advisory Opinions, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/
ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm (Mar. 2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
292 International Court of Justice Website, Advisory Opinions, at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm (Mar. 2, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
293 See id.
294

See id.

295

See supra note 279.

296 Matthew Levitt, Navigating the US Government's Terrorist Lists, The
Washington Institute, PolicyWatch 585 (Nov. 30, 2001), available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch2001.585.htm.
297 Id. There are separate lists, primarily to make use of all resources available to
disarm terrorist financing. The designation of the lists is the responsibility of a task force
involving representatives from the Treasury Department, State Department, Justice
Department, the FBI and the CIA. Id.
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detailed steps to formulate its list, Lebanon's attempt to show that
the United States298has not met the criminal investigation threshold
will be difficult.
Fourth, Lebanon asserts the need for a bilateral agreement to
compel compliance with the terrorist lists.2 99 While there is no
specific bilateral agreement between the United States and
Lebanon, their membership in the United Nations serves as "an
agreement to uphold the objectives of that organization, to
maintain peace and cooperate in solving international problems,
and to harmonize the efforts between Member States to resolve
issues."3 ° When a country joins the United Nations, it agrees to
uphold these objectives and to accept the U.N. Charter, which sets
forth guidelines for international relations.30 ' The United Nations
has incorporated Resolution 1373 in its charter, therefore,
Lebanon, as a member of the United Nations,302 is bound to
comply.30 3 In conclusion, the emphasis on the absence of a
bilateral agreement is misplaced because the U.N. Charter, to
which the United States and Lebanon have both assented, serves
as an agreement among
all member-states to further the U.N. goal
30 4
to eradicate terrorism.
b. U.S. Response to Lebanon
In response to the U.N. deadline for nations to respond to a list
of seventeen questions on counter-terrorism efforts, Lebanon was
among the twenty countries that submitted the answers on time.30 5
Lebanon requested that the United Nations examine the difference
between terrorism and "the legitimate right of peoples to resist

298

See id.

299

See supra note 279.

300 UNITED NATIONS,
NATIONS

BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED

(Mar. 2, 2002), available at http://www.un.org.

301 UNITED NATIONS, PREAMBLE TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, (Jan. 27,
2002), available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/preamble.htm.
302 Lebanon joined the United Nations on October, 24, 1945. UNITED NATIONS,
LIST OF MEMBER STATES, (Mar. 27, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/
Overview/unmember.htmI.
303

Supra note 141.
supra note 300.
MacFarquhar, supra note 285.

304 UNITED NATIONS,
305
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foreign occupation. '
While the United States recognizes the
added social and political dimensions of Hezbollah, it has not
forgotten the bombings of a U.S. Marine base and two U.S.
embassies in Lebanon in the early 1980s, 3" 7 as well as additional
bombings, some involving the death of Americans.3"8 Although,
Hezbollah actions against Israeli troops are not considered to be
terrorist,309 it is the terrorist actions that extend beyond the borders
of Lebanon that are of concern to the United States.31°
c. InternationalSupportfor Lebanon
In addition, not all countries have disagreed with Lebanon's
position that Hezbollah is not a terrorist group.3 ' Cilina Nasser,
from the Beruit newspaper, The Daily Star, stated, "When the
United States placed Hezbollah on a list of terrorist organizations
whose assets should be frozen, the Lebanese government
repeatedly said that it considered Hezbollah a legitimate resistance
party whose military activities were confined to occupied
territories."3"2
A European Union official based in Brussels (who asked to
remain anonymous) stressed the difficulty for the Lebanese
government to move against Hezbollah because of its fundamental
role in the local political and social landscape, along with the
306

Id.

307

Id.

308 Id. The Hezbollah is accused of assisting in the 1996 bombing of Khobar
Towers in Saudi Arabia which killed nineteen American servicemen. The Hezbollah
also attacked the Israeli embassy in Argentina in the 1990s and is suspected of bombing
an Israeli culture center there. Id.
309 Id.
310

Id.

Michael Puttre, Iran voices supportfor Hizbollah; Middle East Report, J. ELEC.
DEF., Jan. 1, 2002, at 24, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. Middle
East News Online reported that Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed el-Sadr
reiterated the country's support for Hezbollah, saying the group is necessary to the
country's protection from Israeli occupation. Iran also supports Hezbollah's cause and
refuses to acknowledge its terrorist activities. In addition, Syria has been a long
supporter of Hezbollah. Id.
312 Glen C. Carey, Politics-MiddleEast: Resistance Grows To U.S. Terrorism War,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 12, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. Nasser
notes that Lebanon considers Hezbollah a "heroic resistance group" for its eviction of the
Israelis from southern Lebanon. Id.
311
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public perception that the group is not a terrorist organization, but
rather a politically influential, heroic one.313
The official
expressed concern about the United States's undiplomatic
expectation from Lebanon, noting that "it is a bit short-sighted and
naive of the Americans ' 3to
think the Lebanese government can
14
move against Hezbollah.
After a Senate delegation visit to Lebanon, the Belgian
government concurred with Hezbollah's assertions that it is simply
a resistance group, not a terrorist organization.315 In an official
comment, the head of the Senate delegation, Joseal Dopiea, stated
that the United States needed to distinguish between terrorists and
resistance groups in designating whose assets are to be frozen.3" 6
The United States, however, does not see how it can fight
a war
317
against terrorism without including this group on the list.

This inclusion risks alienating allies in the Middle East and
potentially around the world.318 Even strong allies of the United
States, such as the European Union, did not list Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization whose assets it would freeze.3 1 9 For this, the
United States has stated that the European Union is not quite as

313

Id.

314

Id.

315 Belgian Senate Delegation Confirms Hezbollah as Resistance Group, XINHUA
Jan. 20, 2002, at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
316 Id. In making this statement, Dopiea suggested that Belgium was not the only
Western country who supported this opinion. Id.
317 Hezbollah Still Involved in TerroristActivities, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 10,
2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. "We cannot be against al-Qaeda and
support Hezbollah and [the Palestinian Islamic movement] Hamas," said U.S. National
Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice. Id.
318 See Carey, supra note 312; Belgian Senate Delegation Confirms Hezbollah as
Resistance Group, supra note 315.
319 Bruce Zagaris, European Union Adds to list of Terrorist Groups, 18 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 2, Feb. 2002, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group
File. In October 2001, U.S. President George Bush asked the European Union to add all
the groups on the U.S. terrorist list to its own list by the end of the year. However, some
E.U. members did not agree that there was sufficient evidence linking such groups to
terrorism. Id. The British intend to extend the list to include the PKK, a Kurdish
nationalist group in Turkey; Hezbollah in Lebanon; and the entire Hamas organization,
rather than only the Hamas-lzz-al-Din al-Qassem. Id. As Zagaris notes, "[t]he
politicization of the listing of terrorist groups is reflected in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
where the U.S. is more pro-Israel than the EU." Id.
GENERAL NEWS SERVICE,

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 28

supportive as it needs it to be in the war on terrorism.3 2' A new
ambassador to Lebanon has openly stated that he does not believe
that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization,32 and the European
Union has still refused to put Hezbollah on its list of terrorist
organizations. 322
According to its previous threats of freezing assets of banks
that refused to comply,3 23 the United States is in a position in
which it previously stated it would take action.3 24 With Lebanon
presenting the first real international challenge to its financial
policy, the United States must now evaluate not only its criteria in
determining what is a terrorist organization, but also what
international authority may be in conflict with its policies. Finally,
the question remains whether the United States will go so far in its
war on terrorism as to alienate the very allies that would be crucial
to its success.
In the three months since Lebanon's first refusal
to freeze Hezbollah assets, the United States did not take action to
freeze any Central Bank assets held in the United States; yet it sent
a more subtle message to Lebanon by initially vetoing Lebanon's
recent request for a donor conference to deal with its debt
problems.326 Perhaps responses like these will be more appropriate
than the threatened freezing of bank assets. While it may be
difficult for the United States to freeze Lebanon's assets, it can,
however, make it more difficult for Lebanon to act on the global
economic stage. 327 Lebanon does most of its foreign banking with
320 Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Syria: Hearing Before the Middle East and
South Asia Subcomm. of the House InternationalRelations Comm., 108th Cong. (2002),
availableat LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
321 Id.
322

Id.

Since President Bush's Executive Order, supra note 34, the United States has
authority to freeze assets of those foreign banks that refuse to comply and promised to do
so. Id.
324 Id. The United States claimed it would freeze assets of those who failed to
freeze terrorist assets. Id.
325 See Zagaris, supra note 319. Even though the European Union did not include
Hezbollah on its list of assets to freeze, with the Presidency of the European Union now
rotating to Spain, the European Union has proclaimed that combating terrorism is the
number one priority of the administration. Id.
326 See Carey, supranote 312.
327 Id.
323
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European banks, not U.S. banks.3 28 The threat of the European
Union joining forces with a financial blockade like that of the
United States is leaving many Lebanese worried.3 29 Despite these
concerns, three months later, Lebanon shows no signs of
reconsidering its decision, as it still suggests that the United States
is engaging in unacceptable means to carry out its plan to fight
terrorism. 33° U.S. Ambassador Battle stated that he "regretted the
change in Lebanon's cooperation with regard to chief terror
33 yet made no mention of the repercussions of
suspect bin Laden,""
33 2
the decision.
3. Countries Refuse to Freeze Hamas Assets
In addition to the controversy over Hezbollah, conflict has also
arisen over most European countries' refusal to freeze the assets of
Hamas, a Palestinian militant group. 333 The European Union put
only the military wing of the Hamas on the list, and other
countries, like Saudi Arabia, have not frozen any portion of the
group's assets at all.334 Many of the Arab, as well as European
countries, view the organization as legitimate with legitimate
political figures involved, therefore, making the decision to freeze
assets a very difficult one. 335 Despite the refusal of some countries
to freeze Hamas's assets, the United States has reenforced its
commitment to freezing this group's assets. In a recent suit
stemming from murder of a seventeen-year-old American by a
member of Hamas, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that an organization that contributes to a
terrorist organization with knowledge that it engages in terrorism
has aided-and-abetted the terrorism and may be liable for

328

Ghattas, supra note 261.

329

Id.

330 US acting like "Unjust School Principal": Lebanon parliament, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 10, 2002, at LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File, "Lebanese
parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri on Sunday accused the United States of behaving like
an 'unjust school principal' in the world while remaining biased in favour of Israel." Id.
331 Mallet, supra note 262.

332 Id.

333 Alden, supra note 9.
334 Id.
335 Id.
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damages.336
While more names are being added to the asset freeze lists, it
is clear that organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, will not
be on the lists of all nations in the war against terrorism.337 What
is not clear is how far the United States will go to ensure
compliance with its list.
4. Domestic Suits: The Global Relief Foundation and
The Benevolence International Foundation
The United States may have more than international problems
with enforcement of its asset freezing policy because one
organization whose assets were frozen on December 14, 2001, has
already sought relief in U.S. courts.33 8
The Global Relief
Foundation, an Islamic charity, was accused of providing financial
assistance to terrorists, and its assets were frozen pending
investigation. 339 By filing suit in federal court, the group stated
that the government has not made a sufficient legal case to block
its assets and seize its property. 340 The group also argued that
without the information taken it had no reasonable way of
conducting a defense against the allegations and that the block was
an unconstitutional act that prevented it from carrying out its
charity work.3 41 The Treasury Department response was confident
that its action was in full compliance with the expansion of its
power under Executive Order 12,334, but the Department allowed

336 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing family
of American citizen shot and killed by members of Hamas personal recovery from the
leading Muslim charity, the Holy Land Foundation, which funded the Hamas in the years
prior to the shooting). This was the first time 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000) had been used
against an organization funding terrorists. The statute gives American-citizen victims of
such terror anywhere in the world a civil remedy with treble damages and attorneys' fees
against those who commit murder or assault. Terrorism FightingTools, Hearing Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Nathan Lewin, Lewin &
Lewin LLP), available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, Hearing File.
337 See Alden, supra note 9; Zagaris, supra note 319.

338 Allan Dodds Franck, Islamic Charity Fights Assets Freeze, Jan. 28, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/01/28/inv.charilty.lawsuit/index.html.
Id.
340 Id. The government blocked $900,000 of the group's assets and seized
computers, documents, and equipment during a raid of its office. Id.
339

341 Id.
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the release of some of the organization's funds to pay legal bills. 342
This constitutional challenge to the asset freeze may be the first of
many for the government in this respect, and the United States will
have to deal with this challenge as well as the aforementioned
international conflicts.
Another domestic entity, the Benevolence International
Foundation (BIF), was placed on the list on November 19, 2002. 343
BIF was created in 1992 and purports to be a non-profit
organization that seeks to provide humanitarian aid to countries
around the world.3 44 The Executive Director, Enaam Arnaout, was
charged with operating BIF as a racketeering enterprise and
providing financing to terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda.345
Paul O'Neill reported that there is "substantial evidence" that
Arnaout has a "close relationship" with bin Laden. 346 These
instances confirm U.S. suspicions that terrorism is not only
financed overseas but in our own backyard as well.
VI. Challenges to Fighting the Financial War Against
Terrorism
A. Will FinancialSanctions Work?
Well over a year into the financial war on terrorism, the United
States feels that it is making significant progress in thwarting
further terrorist fundraising attempts. 347 However, the financial
war has been more challenging than anticipated, primarily due to
the discovery of a broad array of al-Qaeda funding sources, the
intertwining of charitable organizations and legitimate businesses
with the illegal activities, and the conflict with those countries
who see many of these organizations as legitimate and, therefore,
342

Id.

343 OFFICE OF INT'L PROGRAMS,

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREASURY DESIGNATES

2002), http://usinfo.state.gov/
topical/econ/mlc/02111901.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation). The Treasury also designated the Benevolence
International Fund in Canada and the Bosanska Idealna Futura in Bosnia as supporting
terrorist organizations. Id.
TREE GROUPS AS TERRORIST FINANCIERS (Nov. 19,

344 Id.
345

Id.

346 Id.

347 Alden, supra note 9.
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have refused to freeze assets.348
Once the hurdle of defining those organizations against whom
financial sanctions are warranted and justified is surmounted, there
3 49
are still issues of whether sanctions are effective, fair, or just.
Financial sanctions are viewed as an effective way to pressure an
entity to comply with U.N. objectives without resorting to the use
of force and to give effect to the decisions of the Security
Council.35° The people of the world have entrusted the United
Nations as the appropriate body to establish and monitor such
measures, and it can be said that the United Nations, not the
United States, should wage the financial war on terrorism to be
most effective.35 '
B. Criticism of the Use of Sanctions
Yet, "a great number of states and humanitarian organizations
have expressed concern at the possible adverse impact of sanctions
on the most vulnerable segments of the population, such as women
and children. '35 2 Additionally, sanctions can have disastrous
consequences on the economy of third-world countries.353
Most member-States agree that improvement is needed in the
design, application, and implementation of sanctions mandated by
the Security Council.354 "The negative effects of sanctions can be
reduced either through incorporating carefully thought out
humanitarian exemptions directly in Security Council resolutions
' by extending the sanctions only to
or by better targeting them"355
those segments of the population that are responsible for terrorist
acts.356 "One alternative gaining support is 'smart sanctions,'

348

Id.

349 Josh Meyer, Charity Sues Over Anti-Terror Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at
A9.
350 Security Council Concludes Discussion on Sanctions-Related Issues, M2
PRESSWIRE Oct. 26, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
351 Id.
352 Id.

353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Id.

356 Bacre Ndiaye, UN Expert Warns Anti-Terror Measures Could Bring Human
Rights Violations, ARABIC NEWS, Dec. 25, 2001, http://www.arabicnews.com/
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which seek to pressure regimes rather than peoples and thus
reduce humanitarian costs."3'57 Smart sanctions would work only
by "freezing financial assets and blocking the financial
transactions of political elites or entities whose behavior triggered
the use of sanctions in the first place," rather than punishing an
entire country of people. 358 "Smart sanctions" have been used most
recently against countries in Africa who are dealing with wars
supported by exchanging illegally-obtained diamonds for weapons
and contraband.359
Other safeguards for imposing sanctions could include: (1)
ensuring that the sanctions are enforced at the state level, not
merely by the United Nations; (2) close monitoring by the United
Nations despite this state-level implementation; (3) creating time
limits for the sanctions and periodic review of their effectiveness;
and (4) identifying economic consequences
to those countries in
360
of.
advantage
taken
being
of
danger
Alternatively, one ponders whether the United Nations should
impose financial sanctions at all. Would another means of stifling
terrorism be just as effective without the risk of harmful effects to
innocent people? The United Nations rarely used sanctions until
the last ten years, and in this decade, it has employed this
technique only twelve times. 361
During this recent period,
sanctions have not always been proven to be effective.362 This is
primarily because states have continuously refused to enforce
them, stating often that it was too costly economically or from a
humanitarian standpoint.363

ansub/Daily/Day/01 1225/2001122530.html.
357 Security Council Concludes Discussion on Sanctions-RelatedIssues, supra note
350.
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 Id. (discussing statements by Alistair Harrison, United Kingdom's representative
to the United Nations, on the effectiveness of sanctions).

361 Id.
362

Id. (discussing statement by Jagdish Koondul, Representative from Mauritius).

363 Id.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 28

C. Examples andSuccess of U.S. Economic Sanctions as
ForeignPolicy Tools
This is not an isolated instance of the United States pressuring
allies to conform to its economic policies.364 While the full
authority of this asset freezing legislation has not been tested, if it
does create international conflicts with allies, the United States
will most likely rely on its "national security" exemption under
GATT.365
In 1995, to combat a large-scale drug threat, President Clinton
issued Executive Order 12,978, blocking assets and prohibiting
financial transactions with narcotics traffickers.366 Using authority
granted to him under IEEPA and the National Emergency Powers
Act, President Clinton blocked all property and interests in
property within the United States of drug traffickers and anyone
who materially assisted in the trafficking, including those who
provided financial support.367 Because this law extends to foreign
branches of banks, this incident illustrates that the Treasury
Department has in the past been given the authority to freeze
364 See Lynn R. Coleman & Thomas R. Graham, The Stars and Stripes Wherever:
The Impact of the Unilateral U.S. Economic Sanctions of the InternationalPetroleum
Industry, 35 ALBERTA L. REV. 334, 334 (1997). Historically, the United States has taken
action through the use of international economic sanctions against those who do business
with countries whose interests are adverse to the United States, two recent examples
being the Iran (Libya) Oil Sanctions Bill and the Helms-Burton Act, affecting Cuba. Id.
at 336. The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 effectively became a global embargo, prohibiting
entities outside the United States that are controlled by the United States from doing
business with Cuba, the repercussions being that they would not be permitted to do
business with the United States. Id. Sponsors of the legislation have stated, "You can
trade with them or you can trade with us." Id. at 346. This eerily mirrors President
Bush's statement regarding other countries' responsibility to freeze assets, for he stated:
"You are either for us or against us," suggesting that those who did not freeze assets
were "against us." See Pauline Dyson, U.S. is Learning it Needs Other Nations, THE
BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 17, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. The Iran
(Libya) Oil Sanctions Act not only forbids U.S. investment in Iranian oil and gas, but
allows the United States to impose a secondary boycott on foreign companies who invest
or trade with Iran. Coleman & Graham, supra note 364, at 344.
365 Coleman & Graham, supra note 364, at 343.
366 Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics
Traffickers, 60 Fed. Reg. 54579 (Oct. 21, 1995).
367 Id. The section blocked property of those who "materially assist in, or provide
financial or technological support for or goods or services in support of' the traffickers.
Id. § (1)(ii).
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foreign bank assets for failure to comply with U.S. laws.3 68 The
success of this action, however, is disputed.369 It is unclear how
much money was frozen under OFAC's Specially Designated
Narcotics Traffickers (SDNT) program, but since the program's
inception in 1995 almost a dozen drug kingpins and approximately
568 SDNTs have been designated.37° Statistics from OFAC state
that sixty companies with combined annual incomes of around
$230 million linked to drug traffickers have been liquidated or are
in the liquidation process. 371 This does not seem like a huge
reduction in drug money considering that estimates place the retail
value of illicit drug trade between $300 billion and $500 billion
annually. 37 2 "Interpreting the seizure figures very generously, in
the case of narcotics, asset freezes have disrupted less than one
percent of the annual money flow. ' 37 3 By analogy, if the
antiterrorist program is ten times as successful, and disrupts ten
percent of terrorist funding, it will leave ninety percent of terrorist
money available for future attacks. 374 Therefore, despite the
implementation of far-reaching asset freezes, the United States
may have minimal success, while potentially alienating many
allies.
Although financial sanctions have been recognized as an
37
important part of fighting terrorism long before September 11, 1
to be successful, the war on terrorism must be fought on several
fronts. Therefore, are economic sanctions really critical to the war
on terrorism?

368

Id.

369 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Using Sanctions to Fight Terrorism,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY BRIEFS, No. 01-11 (Nov. 2001), at
http://www.iie.com/policybriefs/news0l-I l.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
370 Id.

371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.

375 See Steven Emerson, How to Really Fight Terrorism, WALL ST. J.,Aug. 24,
1998, at A12.
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D. Would Alternatives to Economic Sanctions Be As
Effective?
What other measures should be used aside from those
delineated in the post-September 11 legislation? In a recent
speech, President Bush cited volunteerism as one way that
everyone could fight terrorism376 because this furthered the very
principles of goodness, kindness, and freedom that terrorists
threatened on September I1. 7
Suggestions for combating terrorism range from the obvious
(military engagement) to the non-obvious (exercise)378 to the ones
mentioned in this Comment. Would a war on terrorism be as
effective if we did not engage in a financial attack as well? Most
experts say no.379 At the very least, the financial war is crucial to
helping identify terrorists, even though all the positive effects from
it may not ever be realized.38
VII. Conclusion-Fighting a Global War on Terrorism: A
Warning
Fear breeds repression, repression breeds hate and that hate
menaces stable government. 381

-Justice Louis Brandeis

376 Bush
Urges Volunteerism As a Way to Fight Terrorism, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/30/bush.sou (Jan. 30, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).

377 Id.
378 Clarence Bass, Don't Bend to the Terrorists, Fight Back with Exercise,
http://www.cbass.com/Terrorism.htm. His advice:

Most of us can't take direct action against Osama bin Laden and his terrorist
network. We'll have to leave that to President Bush and the powers that be.
But we can do our part to restore the country to normalcy: We can hug our
family and friends, work hard, spend money, buy stock, have fun. And we can
fight back with exercise.
Id.
379 See Eichenwald, supra note 3, at Al.
"A military success would not be
sufficient without an attack on the financial infrastructure," cited Michael Zeldin, former
head of the money laundering section at the Justice Department, because it would never
get to the basis of eradicating terrorism. Id.
380 Id.
381 David Cole, How Not to Fight Terrorism, 18 AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 22, 2001), at
http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/18/cole-d.html. (citing Justice Louis Brandeis) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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The world needs to be careful with a war on terrorism not to
create more oppression than it seeks to eradicate. Already some
countries have used the "war on terrorism" to infringe upon
citizens' freedoms in ways that are as reprehensible as terrorist
acts.382 For instance, Cuba cites as part of its "war on terrorism" a
new measure allowing the death penalty to be used against those
who use the Internet to make statements that incite political
violence.383 Another example is Syria's report to the United
Nations that it chose to fight terrorism by eliminating a private
banking system and private charities. 384 Also, Zimbabwe's plan to
fight terrorism includes making it a crime to make any critical
comments about President-dictator Robert Mugabe.3 85
In response to the United States's new legislation, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is keeping a close eye on
the potential human rights violations.386 The ACLU is particularly
concerned with the provisions of the legislation to fight terrorism
that allows holding immigrants for as long as seven days without
even being formally charged; yet, President Bush declares that the
legislation does not infringe upon Constitutional protections.387
The asset freeze has been criticized as overreaching,
inefficient, and ineffective, and Constitutional challenges
involving unreasonable searches and seizures and violations of due
process have already arisen.388 Experts agree that the war on
terrorism will be a long process, and victories may not be
imminent.389 International cooperation, strengthened by a strong
U.N. position, will aid in the likelihood of success, but will the
United States continue to act outside the authority of the United
382

Id.

383 James Bovard, Don't Bed Down With Tyrants to Fight Terrorism, USA TODAY,
Jan. 9. 2002, All.
384 Id.
385 Id. The author also suggests that people have more to fear from governments in
the form of oppression than they do from terrorists. Id.
386 Adam Clymer, Bush Quickly Signs Measure Aiding Anti-Terror Measure, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 27, 2001, at B5. Anthony D. Romero, the Director of the ACLU stated that
a priority was for citizens "to be safe and free," therefore the implementation of the new
legislation would be monitored very closely by the organization. Id.
387 Id.

388 Id.
389

See Eichenwald, supra note 3, at Al.
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Nations? Considering the lack of a U.N. definition for "terrorism"
and the United Nations's hesitancy in creating its own list of
terrorist organizations whose assets are to be frozen, 'Will the world
continue to allow the United States to lead the financial war on
terrorism?
Unless the United Nations projects a concrete, definitive plan
for the war on terrorism the United States should be allowed to
freeze the assets of those organizations it has determined to be
terrorist. 390 A delay would only allow the terrorist funds to
disburse and scatter more, decreasing the likelihood of them ever
being found. 39 ' Therefore, allowing the United States to proceed
with its aggressive attack at the financial core of terrorists, while
seemingly overreaching and intruding into the national policies of
other countries, is preferable to the United Nations's "wait and
see" approach, which would allow more terrorist financing to
occur in the meantime.3 92 The United States needs to implement
safeguards to protect the civil rights of those whose assets are
affected and those financial institutions whose rights to do
business are limited, but this already seems to exist in the
extensive form of terrorist organization designation that occurs.393
On the issue of freezing foreign bank assets, the United States
must proceed at its own peril.394 While there may not be an
international legal recourse for those banks, there are sure to be
consequences in the form of diplomatic and political strains. 395 If

the United States has completed a careful cost-benefit analysis of
the benefits of an aggressive approach to the financial war versus
disruption of international relations its actions could cause and
its
determined that it will press the asset freeze to the full extent39of
6
promises, then no international law currently exists to stop it.

Finally, with the magnitude and recency of the events
occurring on September 11 already beginning to fade, the world
risks losing momentum and unified support for the fight against
390

See Zagaris, supra note 319.

391

Id.

392 Id.
393

See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.

394

See id.

395 Id.
396 Id.
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terrorism if it waits too long for alternative measures to combat
terrorism.
The proactive U.S. measures, while arguably
overbroad, make a strong statement to those who may attempt
further terrorist attacks and undoubtedly impair the practicability
of such attacks. Although it will require inevitable compromise,
only by taking a strong, integrated, and unified stance will the
world be in a position to identify terrorists and prevent additional
attacks, rather than simply waiting for such terror to be repeated.
ANGELA D. HARDISTER
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